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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, especially since the 1966 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, legal problems involving consumerism and environmental protection have evoked considerable
interest and public concern. Public awareness of the problems
in these areas of the law is due in large part to the procedural device of the class action. By spreading the cost of expensive litigation over all class members, individuals seeking to
prosecute a class action generally are trying to redress their
claims as well as disgorge the defendant of ill gotten gain alProfessor of Law, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. B.S.B.A.
1960, University of Florida; J.D. 1968, University of Miami; LL.M.
1969, Yale Law School. Member Florida Bar Association.
** B.A. 1971, Hastings College; J.D. 1974, University of Nebraska.
1. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
2. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
*
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legedly derived from violation of common law or statutory standards of primary conduct.
There is no unanimity regarding the utility of the class action.
It has met praise from various consumer, environmental and
other public interest groups as well as alarm and disappointment from business 'and industry. Moreover, by denying access
to federal courts under diversity and general federal question
jurisdiction because individual claims of class members are monetarily too small, recent judicial decisions have created considerable
doubt regarding the future of this particular procedural device.
Thus, proponents of the class action are forced to turn to state
courts. Even if a state court would entertain the class action,
the procedural rules often are so restrictive that prosecution
of the class action becomes an exercise in futility.
Consequently, if proponents of class actions are as unsuccessful in state courts as they have been in federal courts, not only
will numerous claims remain unredressed but important cases
or controversies involving national policy will remain unlitigated.
The liberalized provisions for the joinder of claims and parties
contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have greatly
increased the efficiency of the federal courts. However, requirements of subject matter jurisdiction have limited, to some extent,
use of those joinder provisions.
During the past several years, expansion of the use of ancillary
jurisdiction has allowed the federal courts to circumvent some
of those jurisdictional obstacles.
Last year the Supreme Court was confronted with a case
that raised questions regarding the "amount in controversy" requirement for class actions, -as well as the use of the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction. The facts were these:
The complaint, brought by the four named owners of lakefront
property on Lake Champlain on behalf of themselves and some
200 other similarly situated riparian landowners and lessees,
sought compensatory and punative damages in the total amount

of $40,000,000 for damages to their property rights caused by [In-

ternational Paper Company's] alleged pollution of the lake's
waters. Purportedly the discharge of untreated or inadequately
treated waste from [International's] now-closed pulp and paper
making plant in the Village of Ticonderoga, passing into the lake
via Ticonderoga Creek created a massive sludge blanket on the
bottom of the lake; masses of sludge apparently break off periodically to wash up on [plaintiff's] property. As a consequence
[plaintiff's] property is claimed to be unfit for any recreational
or other
reasonable use and to be permanently diminished in
value.3
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The class action suit was brought as a diversity action with
subject matter jurisdiction assertedly resting on section 1332(a)
of Title 28 of the United States Code, which requires that the
"matter in controversy" exceed the sum or value of $10,000.
The claim of each of the named plaintiffs was found to satisfy
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, but the District Court was convinced "to a legal certainty" that not every individual owner in
the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of $10,000.
Reading [Snyder v. Harris] as precluding maintenance of the action by any member of the class whose separate and distinct claim
did not individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount and concluding that it would not be feasible to define a class of property owners each of whom had more than a $10,000 claim, the District
Court
then refused to permit the suit to proceed as a class action. 4
The court of -appeals affirmed the lower court decision over
a vigorous dissent by Judge Timbers,5 and the Supreme Court
granted a petition for writ of certiorari. 6
In that posture, the case of Zahn v. International Paper Co.
presented what the authors consider to be two "separate and
distinct" questions to the Court.
First--Whether each of several class action plaintiffs who are
suing a single defendant may aggregate their separate and distinct
claims in order to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement
of section 1332(a)? Predictably, the Court answered that question
in the negative, refusing to retreat from the doctrine espoused
in Snyder v. Harris"five years earlier.
Second-Whether members of a class whose separate and distinct
claims do not meet the jurisdictional amount requirements of
section 1332 (a) may have their claims determined by a federal
court under a theory of ancillary jurisdiction 9 where other members of the class have similar claims that do meet federal jurisdictional requirements?
Had the Court chosen to overrule Snyder by answering the
first question in the affirmative, the second question would
have become moot, because the theory of ancillary jurisdiction
is used only to allow the federal courts to hear claims over
which they would otherwise lack subject matter jurisdiction.
4. 94 S. Ct. at 507.
5. 469 F.2d at 1036.

6. Cert.granted, 410 U.S. 925 (1973).

7. 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), affd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), af-f'd,
94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
8. 394U.S. 332 (1969).
9. For a discussion of ancillary jurisdiction, see notes 185-204 and accompanying text infra.
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However, having chosen to reaffirm the position taken in Snyder
on the question of aggregation of claims, the Court majority
in Zahn completely ignored10 the second question in spite of
the fact that the ancillary jurisdiction theory was the principal
argument raised in plaintiff's brief, and was the main thrust
of dissents by Judge Timbers" (when the case was before the
court of appeals) and Justice Brennan. 12 The only inference
to be drawn from the Court's holding, affirming both lower
courts, is that the second question was also answered in the
negative.
Part II of this article will deal with some of the "problems"
raised by the Court's affirmation of the Snyder doctrine with
particular reference to restrictions placed on the use of the class
action by that doctrine. Part III will discuss ancillary jurisdiction as it relates to class actions and joinder of parties.
1I.

SNYDER AND THE CLASS ACTION

Because federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction
and are empowered to hear only actions within the judicial
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution and
executed by the laws of Congress,' 3 a party attempting to invoke
jurisdiction of a federal court must establish that the action
is within the province of such a court. Although Article In
of the Constitution provides nine possible situations in which
the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction,1 4 this constitutional
10. The only possible reference to the ancillary jurisdiction theory in the
majority opinion is where the Court quotes the court of appeals opinion to the effect that: "'[ O ]ne plaintiff may not ride in on another's
coattails.'"
94 S. Ct. at 512. That is hardly a sufficient response
to the elaborate arguments contained in plaintiff's brief and in the
dissenting opinions of Judge Timbers and Justice Brennan. See notes
11, 12 infra.

11. 469 F.2d at 1036.
12. 94 S. Ct. at 512. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice
Brennan's dissent.
13. C. WRIGHT,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CourTS

15-26 (2d ed.

1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 vests the judicial power of the United States
in certain courts. Section 2 provides that such
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under- their
authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consus;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;
-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
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grant of power is not self-executing and, therefore, congressional
enactments are necessary to determine how the judicial power
shall be executed.15 Thus, in order to overcome the presumption
that jurisdiction does not rest in a federal court, a party must
establish requisite jurisdictional facts required by both the Constitution and the federal statutes.16 Since the Judiciary Act
of 1789,17 "[o]ne of the essential requisites for maintaining suit
in federal district court is satisfaction of a mandatory jurisdictional
amount."' 8 Purportedly, the requirement of jurisdictional amount
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.

(Emphasis added).

15. See WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 17-26, for a discussion of the debate
over whether article 1I, § 2 of the Constitution is self-executing absent congressional authorizations and enactment.
16. See WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 15-53 for a general discussion of the
requisites for an action in federal court.
17. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.

18. Strausberg, Class Actions and Jurisdictional Amount: Access to a
Federal Forum-A Post Synder v. Harris Analysis, 22 Am. U.L. Rnv.
79 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Strausberg]. In regard to jurisdictional amount, Congress has provided that there shall be a jurisdictional amount requirement for both federal question and diversity of
citizenship cases. The following excerpt from the Supreme Court's
decision in Zahn explains the history underlying the jurisdictional
amount requirement:
1. The section provides in pertinent part that:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between"(1) citizens of different States. .

.

Section 11 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 set the jurisdictional amount in diversity suits at $500. 1 Stat. 78. In
1801, Congress lowered the requirement to $400 in The Law
of the Midnight Judges, 2 Stat. 89, 92, but it was quickly
restored to $500 the following year. 2 Stat. 132. The jurisdictional amount requirement remained fixed at this level
until the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, when it was
raised to $2,000. This figure was subsequently increased by
$1,000 by the Act of March 3, 1911, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091. See
S.Rep.No.388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 30-32 (1910); H.R.
Rep.No.818, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910); Conference Report,
S.Doc.No.848, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess. (1911); 45 Cong.Rec. 35963599 (March 23, 1910); 46 Cong.Rec. 4002, 4003, 4004 (March
2, 1911).
The current $10,000 jurisdictional amount, codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), was enacted by the Act of July 25, 1958,
72 Stat. 415. The legislative history discloses that the change
was made "on the premise that the amount should be fixed
at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in
all substantial controversies where other elements of Federal
jurisdiction are present. The jurisdictional amount should
not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts
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is intended to keep "petty controversies?' out of federal courts.19
However, since the initiation of the jurisdictional amount requirement, the requisite element has been the subject of considerable
controversy and debate.20 The general thrust of the following
discussion focuses on the impact that the Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder and Zahn will have on class actions in federal
courts where class members are not allowed to aggregate their
"separate and distinct" claims in order to satisfy the requirement
of jurisdictional amount.
Snyder was the first major class action case to reach the
Supreme Court after the promulgation of the 1966 amendments
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue
in Snyder was whether the named parties of record, who sought
to maintain a class action predicated on diversity of citizenship,
could aggregate their "separate and distinct" claims in order to
satisfy the ten thousand dollar jurisdictional 'amount requirement.
Based on the Court's previous decisions in Troy Bank v. White23
22
and Clark ?. Paul Gray, Inc.,
head & Co., 21 Pinel v. Pine

19.
20.
21.

22.

of big business nor so law [sic] as to fritter away their time
in the trial of petty controversies." S.Rep.No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1958); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1958, p. 3101; see also id., at 21; H.R.No. 1706, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., 3 (1958).
2. Section 1331 (a) provides:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws,. or treaties of the
United States."
94 S.Ct. at 508 nn. 1, 2.
S.REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
See WRiGHT, supra note 13, at 107-29, for a general discussion and
analysis of the jurisdictional amount requirement.
222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911) (plaintiffs seeking enforcement of a vendor's
lien had a joint interest in the claim). See New Orleans Pac. Ry.
v. Parker, 143 U.S. 42, 51 (1892) (bond holders secured by a mortgage
had a joint interest in the property of the mortgage); Handley v.
Stutz, 137 U.S. 366, 369-70 (1890) (individual shareholders and creditors of an insolvent corporation had a joint interest in a claim for
failure to pay stock subscriptions); The Connemara, 103 U.S. 754, 755
(1880) (salvors had a joint interest in recovery); Shields v. Thomas,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 3, 4-5 (1854) (plaintiff distributees had a joint
interest in the estate). Because the interests of the plaintiffs in the
above cases were characterized as joint, as opposed to separate and distinct, the court allowed aggregation of the collective claims in order
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
240 U.S. 594 (1916). The Court prohibited aggregation of what it
characterized as 'separate and distinct' claims brought by plaintiffs,
who as children and heirs, claimed an interest under the testator's
will. The Court held that testator's omission of one of his children
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the Snyder Court held that named plaintiffs could not aggregate
the amount of their "separate and distinct" claims in order to
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.24 Snyder was received
with mixed feelings; 25 moreover, instead of synthesizing the argufrom his will was distinct from the question of whether a similar
mistake was made with reference to another child.
23. 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (plaintiffs' interest in enjoining enforcement
of a state statute exacting fees for the caravaning of vehicles were
separate and distinct and thus could not be aggregated to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount).
24. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1969):
The doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not
be aggregated was never, and is not now, based upon the
categories of old Rule 23 or of any rule of procedure. That
doctrine is based upon this Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase "matter in controversy." The interpretation of
this phrase as precluding aggregation substantially predates
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 1911 this court
said in Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co.:
"When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and
distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy
in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each
be of the requisite jurisdictional amount ...

."

222

U.S. 39, 40.
By 1916 this Court was able to say in Pinel v. Pinel, 240
U.S. 594, that it was "settled doctrine" that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated to meet the requiredjurisdictional amount. In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939), this doctrine, which had first been declared in
cases involving joinder of parties, was applied to class actions
under the then recently passed Federal Rules. In that case
numerous individuals, partnerships, and corporations joined
in bringing a suit challenging the validity of a California
statute which exacted fees of $15 on each automobile driven
into the State. Raising the jurisdictional amount question
sua sponte, this Court held that the claims of the various fee
payers could not be aggregated "where there are numerous
plaintiffs having no joint or common interest or title in the
subject matter of the suit." 306 U.S., at 588. Nothing in the
amended Rule 23 changes this doctrine.
(Emphasis added).
25. Maraist & Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris: Whither Goes The Spurious
Class Action?, 41 Mss. L.J. 379 (1970) (generally agreeing with Snyder) [hereinafter cited as Maraist & Sharp]. However, they began
their article with the observation that:
The United States Supreme Court's somewhat surprising
decision in the recent case of Snyder v. Harris has dealt a
crippling blow to hopes for widespread use of the "spurious"
type of class action in federal courts and has forced procedural scholars to take another look at the future of this fascinating procedural device.
Id. at 379. For a general criticism, see Srausberg, supra note 18.
For the debate over the utility of class actions, see, e.g., Blecher, Is
the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiffs Viewpoint), 55
F.R.D. 365 (1972); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the
Small Claimant, 10 B.C. InD. & CoM. L. REv. 501 (1969); Simon,
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ments as to the role of class actions in federal courts, the decision
merely confused the issues2 6 and compounded the uncertainty as
to the future of Federal Rule 23 (b) (3) class actions.2 7 The question
of aggregation was again presented to the Court in Zahn. In Zahn
the Court held that although each of the named plaintiff lakefront
owners individually satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement,
the class action aspect of the suit against the defendant papermill
was properly dismissed by the federal district court since it had
not been established that each of the unnamed class members,
about two hundred unnamed lakefront property owners and
lessees, had satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement.2 8 Thus,
although Zahn dispells any confusion as to how far Snyder extends
to limit the aggregation of "separate and distinct" claims with respect to class actions, the full impact of Snyder and Zahn on the
future of class actions in federal courts remains uncertain. The
Snyder Court opined that
while the class action device serves a useful function across the
entire range of legal questions, the jurisdictional amount requirement applies almost exclusively to controversies based upon diversity of citizenship. A large part of those matters involving federal
questions can be brought, by way of class2 9actions or otherwise,
without regard to the amount in controversy.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Fortas took issue with the majority's
perception of the Snyder holding's impact. 30 According to the
dissent, the Snyder decision's major shortcoming is that it fails to
Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction? 55 F.R.D. 375
(1972); Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View,
10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 515 (1969).
26. In Strausberg, supra note 18, at 79, the holding of Snyder was characterized as "that where multiple plaintiffs have claims that are separate and distinct, to maintain a successful class suit in federal court,
each individual member of the class must meet the monetary requirement." The author's comment inaccurately states the holding of the
Snyder court. In Maraist & Sharp, supra note 25, at 384, the authors
carefully delimit the extent of the Snyder opinion:
The decision in Snyder, however, does not foreclose the
possibility that the existence of one named representative
whose claim reaches the jurisdictional amount requirement
might empower the court to entertain a class action that includes other members with claims that do not satisfy the requirement.
Whether the unnamed members of the FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) class
action must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount was the issue raised and decided affirmatively by Zahn.
27. See 73 CoLum. L. REv. 359 (1973); 6 IND. L. REV. 812 (1973); 61 GEO.
L.J. 1327 (1973); 7 GA.L.REv. 390 (1973).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 507.
29. 394 U.S.at 341.
30. Id. at 342.
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consider the full impact that disallowing aggregation of claims will
have on class actions predicated on federal questions.31 The dissent's objection to Snyder is compounded by Zahn. Here the Court
extended Snyder in holding that even if the named plaintiffs satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement, a class action cannot be
maintained unless each individual unnamed class member also
satisfies the jurisdictional amount. In view of this recent development, any future that a class action might have in federal court
based on the jurisdictional predicate of federal question, under
section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code, appears quite
limited. A more detailed examination of the impact of Snyder
and Zahn on federal question class actions will indicate that the
deliterious effect of these decisions will hardly be de minimus.
Morever, where a plaintiff, whether as a representative or represented party, is denied access to federal court to litigate a federal
question because his claim is too "small" to invoke federal jurisdiction, it becomes necessary to examine the efficacy of requiring the
plaintiff, if he is to redress his claim at all, to proceed in the state
courts. In examining the judiciousness of having the plaintiff litigate his federal question in state court, two general considerations
should be kept in mind: first, is requiring state court adjudication of
a federal question a frustration by Snyder and Zahn of the policy
underlying the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23; and second, is allowing multiple state court adjudication of issues
and rights created pursuant to acts of Congress desirable?
A. Development of Class Actions
With the historical aspects of the class action fully explicated
elsewhere,32 suffice it to say here that the class action emerged
in 17th century England as an equitable tool fashioned by the
English chancery. The development occurred in two phases in
response to the rule that in a common law suit "persons who
were not joint obligees or jointly liable could not be united
on one side of a case either by the writ or by court action." 33
This rule proved to be extremely cumbersome and inconvenient
for the parties as well as the common law court. 34 In order
31. Id. at 342-43 n.2.
32. Z. CHAFE., SOm PROBLEMS Or EQUrrY 149-242 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as CHAFEE]. 3b J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 23.02 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as MooRE].
33. CHAFES, supra note 32, at 153.
34. For example, assume a situation where a manorial lord attempts to
appropriate part of the real property which was used by all the tenants. The tenants in defense assert a common right in the same real

property. To resolve this question, it is important to note that the
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to circumvent this restrictive rule prohibiting joinder of parties
with claims that were separate and distinct, chancery created the
bill of peace.35 Although subject to some dispute,36 it was generally
held that multiplicity of suits alone was a ground of equitable
jurisdiction over claims raising common questions of fact and
issues of law, equitable and legal.3

7

It

is important to note,

however, that in the earlier bills of peace, the common law
requirement of joining all interested parties carried over to the
chancery. Thus, no matter how numerous the parties to the
bill of peace might be, all had to be brought before the court
of equity. 38 The second phase of the evolving bill of peace
was a natural development from the common law requirement
of compulsory joinder of parties who had joint or common property interests. 39 "The very identity of interests which made it
easy to bring everybody in, also made it somewhat superfluos
to do so.1' 40 Consequently, the chancery allowed the representative
suit 41 where numerous parties, often people of small means, could

question is legally and factually common to all tenants; it is not a
question of joint interests, because each tenant has a separate and
distinct claim. Thus, in a common-law court, the lord would bring
a separate action against each tenant. Such duplicity of suits is
clearly inconvenient to both the manorial lord and the common-law
court.
In order to avoid the multiplicity of suits, chancery in How v.
Tenants of Broomsgrove, 1 Vern. 22 (1681), accepted a bill of peace
founded on the above facts. "Lord Nottingham observed that these
issues would ordinarily be triable at common-law, but took jurisdiction because the bill was brought to prevent multiplicity of suits."
CHAFE, supra note 32, at 161-63.
35.
Bills of peace may be roughly divided into two groups. In the
first, there are several persons (conveniently called the Multitude) on one side of a controversy, and one person (whom
we may call the adversary) on the other side. Each member
of the multitude threatens litigation or is engaged in pending
litigation with the adversary, and these parallel litigations
involved one or more common questions of law or fact, or
both. The multitude are not joint obligees or obligors, so
that they cannot join or be joined in one common-law writ.
In the second group, there are only two parties with numerous parallel litigations between them.
CHmEz, supra note 32, at 149-50.

36. Id. at 157-71. For a general discussion of whether in addition to multiple suits, it was necessary to have a "general right," "community
of interest" or privity before equity jurisdiction would issue, see
CHAFES, supra note 32, at 161-63.
37. Id. at 157.
38. 1 C. PomEROY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE 445 (4th ed. 1918).
39. CHuknm, supranote 32, at 201.
40. Id.
41. In Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. App. 8 (1866),
discussed at CHAFE, supra note 32, at 202-03, chancery allowed one
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"pool their resources and let a few of their trusted leaders bear the
brunt of the fight.142 With the development of the representative
suit, the parties to the suit as well as the chancery benefited from
the convenience and judicial economy. 43
Although the English courts continue to operate under the
simple rule of 1883, 4 representative suits in the United States
federal courts are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.45 One of the central questions that was not answered in
of the first representative suits.
In 1864 the reservoir of the waterworks had burst causing loss
of life and property damage. Parliament set up a commission to pass
on damage claims. About 1,500 claims were recognized, however, after the statutory expiration of the commission. Sheffield Waterworks
Co. sought a bill of peace in chancery to quash the unlawful claims.
The court of equity allowed the company to bring the bill of peace
against only five of the 1,500 claimants. The remaining 1,495 claimants were not named nor joined as defendants. However, the equity
court took it for granted that it had proper jurisdiction over the unnamed defendants.

The Waterworks decision was largely predicated on the principles

of an earlier case in chancery. In Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves.

429, 444 (1805), Lord Eldon decided that when a claim brought to
equity by a bill of peace was "by or against the public or by or
against a large indefinite number of persons with the exact limits

42.
43.
44.

45.

virtually unascertainable", CHAPEE, supra note 32, at 210, nonjoinder
of parties in a bill of peace did not render the bill defective. Thus,
two important considerations arise: first, the concept of the representative suit where parties of record litigate on behalf of unnamed class
members; and second, recognition of the principle that a bill of peace
could be maintained even though all of the parties with separate and
distinct claims were not joined.
Consequently, aside from the fact that these two cases were some
of the first representative suits, the cases clearly illustrate that representative suits can be used by equity regardless of whether the parties too numerous to be joined are plaintiffs or defendants. Moreover, it is also important to note that both cases were predicated on
issues of common questions of fact and law where the interests of
the 'multitude" were separate and distinct and not joint and common.
CHAFEE, supranote 32, at 202.
Id. at 201.
Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may
sue or be sued, or may be authorized by the Court or a Judge
to defend in such cause or matter, on behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested.
S. Ct. R. 9, Order XVI (1883) (commonly referred to as the English
Court Rule). For a discussion of the English Rule of 1883, see
CHAFEE, supra note 32, at 213.
For the federal courts, the equity rules simply provided:
When the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
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Equity Rule 38 or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
pertained to the res judicata aspects of the court's judgment. 46
Professor Moore proposed to define the res judicata effect of
a judgment in terms of the "jural relations" set forth in the
48
rule. 47

His proposed draft was not accepted by the committee,

more may sue or defend for the whole.
Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). Original FED. R. Civ. P. 23 promulgated on Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937), as authorized by Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (now 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1958)), was essentially a restatement and clarification of Equity R.
38. See MooRE, supra note 32, 123.02[1] at 23-74; FED. R. Civ. P. 23
provided in pertinent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure
the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue
or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and
a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce
it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought.
Subsequent to its promulgation, Rule 23 was widely acclaimed.
Lesar, Class Suits and The Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34 (1937).

See also Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 16
(1938). It was not too long, however, before the class action rule
was the focal point of heated debate and severe criticism. See Kalyen & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Cm. L. REV. 684 (1941); Keefee, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats
Ben Hur, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Developments in the Law,
Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874, 92933 (1958). Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of
Rule 23, 46 COLUm. L. REV. 818 (1946); Comment, Federal Rules:
Class Actions, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 472 (1954); Note, Class Actions and
Interpleaders: California Procedure and the Federal Rules, 6 STAN.
L. REv. 120 (1953); 76 HARv. L. REv. 1675 (1963).
CHAmEE, supra note 32, at 250.
47. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by
the PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571 (1937):
(b) Effect of Judgment. The judgment rendered in the
first situation [the "true" class action, (a) (1) J is conclusive
upon the class; in the second situation [the "hybrid" class ac-

46.

tion, (a) (2) ] it is conclusive upon all parties and privies to the
proceeding and upon all claims, whether presented in the proceedings or not, insofar as they do not or may affect specific
property involved in the proceedings; and in the third situation [the "spurious" class action, (a) (3)] it is conclusive
upon only the parties and privies to the proceeding.
48. In addition to disagreeing with Moore's attempt to substantially de-
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since it was felt the tentative draft would be contrary to the
Enabling Act 49 which required that the Federal Rules should
"neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant." Nevertheless, despite the committee's rejection of
his tentative drafts defining the conclusive attributes of judgments
on the class action and the modification of the prohibition against
aggregation of claims in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement, Moore's basic objectives were realized. The committee accepted Moore's characterization of the jural relations
of class members as "true," "hybrid" and "spurious." 50
fine the conclusive effect of judgment for the "true" and "hybrid"
class actions, the committee also rejected Moore's proposal that the
parties to a Rule 23 (a) (1) class suit should be allowed to aggregate
their claims in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.
See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect
of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 556-63 (1938); 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTcE f 23.04, 23.05, 23.08 (1938).
49. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
50. A student commentator accurately stated the law in noting:
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure it was well established that plaintiffs who possessed separate and distinct rights and who attempted to join
in one diversity [or federal question] action had to independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Aggregation of claims to satisfy that requirement was allowed only
if the plaintiffs asserted a joint right. These jurisdictional
rules were not changed by the cases under the original rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Note, 7 GA. L. REV. 390, 391 (1973). Thus, in "true" class actions,
the plaintiffs asserted a joint and common right and aggregation was
permitted. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939) (joint
interest found in effort to restrain enforcement of state statute which
prevented plaintiffs' licensing of the public performance of their copyrights for profit); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, Inc., 414 F.2d
311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 1037 (1969) (horse owners had
common and undivided interest in fund created by racetrack); Dierks
v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969) (pension rights in defendant's pension fund were joint and common and amount of trust res
satisfied the amount in controversy requirement). See also 3b MooRE,
supra note 32, at 23.95.
In "hybrid" and spurious class actions, the plaintiffs' claims were
separate and distinct and aggregation was denied. See, e.g., City of
Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972) (action for damages for personal injury and property damage brought
against operator of airport); Givens v. W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1972) (no aggregation of claims in action on behalf of class
of persons purchasing books and alleging that interest charges were
usurious); Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971) (no aggregation in action by striking employees against commissioner of social
services for a county seeking an injunction compelling continued payment of welfare benefits); Troup v. McCort, 238 F.2d 289, 294 (5th
Cir. 1956) (action by certificate holding members of mutual life in-
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As the use of the class action became more widespread, Moore's
tripartite characterization of jural relations became the subject
of considerable controversy. 51 Partially in response to analytical
difficulties inspired by Moore's nomenclature, the 1966 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2352 purportedly abansurance society against life insurance company to recover value of
assets); Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1951) (suit
by stockholders to enjoin sale of unissued stock); Knowles v. War
Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
914 (1949) (claims of policyholders to recover insurance premiums).
51. Professor Keefee's analysis of the authority cited in Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (diversity of citizenship
need only exist between the plaintiff and the named parties of record
for the defendant class), demonstrates that the distinction between
"common!' and "several" is illusive and hardly an adequate criterion
for categorizing the attributes of jural relations. Keefee, Levy &
Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CoRaxmL L.Q. 327, 333-36 (1948).

See also Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 380-81 (1967);
Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv.
629, 630-32 (1965). But see Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class
Suits, 60 McH. L. REv. 905, 953 (1962) (suggesting that the "true" and
"hybrid" characterizations of jural relations have produced successful
results); Van Dercreek, The "Is"and "Ought" of Class Actions Under
Federal Rule 23, 48 IowA L. REv. 273, 282 (1963). It is important
to note that Simeone and Van Dercreek both suggest basic revisions
in the "spurious" class suit.
52. The new rule was adopted by the Supreme Court on Feb. 28, 1966,
383 U.S. 1031, 1047-48 (1966). FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provided in pertinent
parts:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
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doned the tripartite classification.5 3 The amendments substituted
what was thought to be a more functional and practical clarification of the utility of the class action.5" By placing considerably
less emphasis on the "jural relations," the amendment drafters
sought to realize three basic purposes.5 5
First, the 1966 amendments were intended to maximize the
utility of the class action in reducing the burden on judicial
dockets resulting from multiplicity of suits. 56 This particular
objective is, of course, merely a reiteration of the basic policy
upon which the English chancery built the bill of peace and
the subsequent representative suit. The second basic objective
act on the grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making
appropriate
inju~nctive
reief
corresponding
declaratory
relief withfinal
respect
to the class
as or
a whole;
or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
53. Moore's jural relation categorization, however, was not the only shortcoming of old Rule 23. Other deficiencies which the amendments
sought to correct were the lack of adequate guides as to the proper
extent of judgments in class actions and the failure of old Rule 23
to adequately handle problems of procedural fairness. Advisory

Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).

FEDu. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) is

largely designed to resolve these deficiencies. Probably one of the
most important features of 23(c) is the provision that makes the
court's ruling on the merits of the case binding on all class members,
regardless whether the suit is a 23(b) (1), (2) or (3) class action,
unless individual class members had previously requested the court
for leave "to opt" out of the class. This was a major modification,
especially in regard to the spurious class action, since under former
Rule 23 a judgment was not binding on absentee class members.
Moreover, some courts allowed such absentee class members to sit
back to wait until the outcome of the suit was evident; then, if the
action looked favorable to the class, these absentee members would
seek judicial permission to intervene and take advantage of the
class victory. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300
F.2d 561, 587-90 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S.
801 (1962).
54. See Advisory Committee's N~ote to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).
55. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10
B.C. INn. & COM€. L. Rnv. 501, 504 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ford].
56. Id. at 504.
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of the amendments focused on minimizing the possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations resulting from multiple actions.
The third policy consideration, probably the most important, was
aiding the individual seeking
that of fashioning a procedural device
57
redress from small claims or injuries.
Since adoption of the Rule 23 amendments in 1966, there
have been three important cases which clearly illustrate that
the underlying purpose of the class action is to aid the individual
claimant with small claims. In Escott v. Barchris Construction
Corp.,58 the court emphasized the policy of old Rule 23 in protecting the small investor:
In our complex modern economic system where a single harmful act may result in damages to a great many people there is
a particular need for the representative action as a device for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify
legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a group.
In a situation where we depend on individual initiative, particularly the initiative of lawyers, for the assertion of rights, there
must be a practical method for combining these small claims, and
the representative action provides that method. The holders of one
or two of the debentures involved in the present action could
hardly afford to take the risk of an individual action. The usefulness of the representative action as a device for the aggregation
of the necessity of a liberal conof small claims is "persuasive
struction of . . Rule 23." 59
The judiciary's concern for the small investor was reiterated
in Dolgow v. Anderson,6 ° a class action fashioned under amended
Rule 23. In an action for recission and damages, four purchasers,
on their own behalf and as representatives of other purchasers
of Monsanto common stock, sued Monsanto and its principal
officers for stock manipulation. 61 In holding that the action
57. Id. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Cii. L. REv. 684, (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalven];

Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32
TRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966).

ANTi-

58. 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1966). See
Comment, Barchris and The Securities Act: Practical Responses for
Attorneys, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 360 (1969).

59. 340 F.2d at 733.
60. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. Id. at 479. The court quoted from the amicus brief filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

"Since the enforcement activities of this Commission do
not serve to make whole investors who have been injured
by a fradulent course of business and since it is economically
impracticable in many instances for investors individually to

pursue available remedies, the representative action appears

to provide the most meaningful method by which their claims

may be pursued and the Congressional policy favoring such
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could properly proceed as a class action, the court noted:
On oral argument in the present case, it was assumed that, in
view of the fact that the costs of the litigation would far exceed
any damages the individual plaintiffs might possibly recover, if
this case does not proceed as a class action, it is unlikely that
it would proceed at all. Thus, to hold that this action could not
proceed as a class action "would . . . be tantamount to a denial
62

of private relief."
The most significant case in the trilogy is Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin.63 Eisen, an odd-lot investor, sought to represent
the class of odd-lot investors who purchased stock between 19621966 from two brokerage firms and the New York Stock Exchange.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the class action,
the court of appeals stated:
Class actions serve an important function in our judicial system. By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many
individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both
eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides
small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims
which
would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.64
remedies may be vindicated."
Id. at 483-84.
62. Id. at 485. The court's conclusion was predicated on the authority
of the Rules Advisory Committee's statement that "the amounts at
stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be
impracticable. The burden that separate suits would impose on the
party opposing the class, or upon the court calendars, may also be
fairly considered." 39 F.R.D. at 104.
63. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
64. 391 F.2d at 560. In analyzing the comparative impact on the small
claimant, the court observed:
Nevertheless, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was originally enacted, did not effectively achieve
either of the above two objectives [eliminate repetitious suits
and aid the small claimant in seeking legal redress]. Class
actions were divided into various categories reflecting the
"jural relationships of the members of the class." See 3
Moore, Federal Practice par. 23.08 at 3434 (2d ed. 1953). Only
after a determination of the nature of the rights: "joint, common or secondary" in the true class action, "several related
to specific property" in the hybrid class action, and "several
affected by a common question and related to common relief"
in the spurious class action, was a court able to proceed. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure,
39 F.R.D. 98 (1965) ....

There were significant differences

in the i"es judicata effects accorded to the various class actions. Thus while a judgment in a true class action was binding on the entire class, the spurious class action only concluded the rights of parties. 3 Moore, Federal Practice par.
23.11 at 3472 (2d ed. 1953). Since the great majority of cases
fell into this latter category, the objective of determining all
questions in one suit was effectively frustrated. In essence,
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"This last, and most important, objective of the Rule is then
quite clear. It is to redress grievances of small claimants." 65
This principle was embodied in the equity rules and Rule 23
preceding the 1966 amendments. Yet, the 1966 amendments, as
promulgated by the Supreme Court, expressly strengthened the
small claimant's arsenal of legal ammunition.60 In so doing, the
intent underlying the amended rule was not only to aid the
small claimant redressing his injuries and claims, but also to
facilitate the small guy in his role as a "private attorney general." 67
Because of these very significant policies underlying the amended
Rule 23, it becomes clear that the tension between Rule 23
and the amount in controversy requirement has been drawn.
This is to say, that if one of the central purposes of amended
Rule 23 is to aid the small claimant, it would appear anomalous,
if not expressly contrary to the spirit of the new rule, to require
the spurious class action was interpreted as merely a permissive joinder device.
391 F.2d at 560 (citations omitted). It should be added, parenthetically, that on removal the federal district court, after a full eviden-

tiary hearing, determined the class action was maintainable. Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However,
on appeal the second circuit reversed and dismissed the case since
the class was determined to be unmanageable and since the plaintiff
could not provide notice to all class members. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 235
(1973).
65. Ford, supra note 55, at 507.
66.
However the Equity Rules and the former Rule [23] did little

to further this objective [aid the small claimant]. As Pro-

67.

Id.

fessor Kaplan stressed, the "smaller guy" normally is not involved with lawyers and legal proceedings. Not many of
such persons would take affirmative action to intervene in
a spurious action under the former Rule. Perhaps recognizing this reluctance to litigate on the part of the "smaller
guy," the drafters of the amended Rule, by obviating in subsection (c) (2) this need for affirmative action, took a major
step in the direction of securing for small claimants a mode
for effective compensation. Subsection (c)(2) is probably
the most dramatic indication that the chief purpose of the
amended Rule is to aid the small claimant.
Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such

group injuries for which individually they are in a poor po-

sition to seek legal redress, either because they do not know
enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to assert his rights alone if and when he
can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all. This result is not only unfortunate
in the particular case, but it will operate seriously to impair
the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much
contemporary law. The problem of fashioning an effective
and inclusive group remedy is thus a major one.
Kalven, supranote 57, at 686.
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individual members of the spurious class action to meet
the juris68
dictional amount requirement of ten thousand dollars.
68. Prior to the Snyder decision, several different courts allowed the parties to a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action to aggregate the amount of damages in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Based
on the inherent purpose of Rule 23 as amended to provide redress
for the small claimant, the district court in Snyder v. Epstein, 290
F. Supp. 652, 658 (D. Wis. 1968), held:
The purposes of class actions would be largely defeated,
especially in the situation like this one before the court where
a stockholder is seeking to recover for the breach of trust
by officers and directors of the corporations, [if] it is held
that only persons with a claim in excess of $10,000 may institute a class action. With such reasoning, it is not inconceivable that corporate directors could be totally immune
from suit in a federal court, although there could be literally
hundreds of stockholders with a legitimate cause of action
against the directors.
See Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393, 398, 399 (D. I. 1968); Booth
v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 470-71 (D. IIl. 1967).
In Snyder, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider decisions of the fifth and eighth circuits that were in conflict with a decision of the tenth circuit on whether it was permissible to aggregate
claims of members of a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action in order to satisfy
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount necessary for a diversity of citizenship action pursuant to § 1332.
In Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967), the court held that named plaintiffs
in a diversity action against defendant insurance company, brought
as a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action, could not aggregate their separate
and distinct claims to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The court noted that the amended Rule 23, in regard to the issue
of aggregation, is "of no avail to (plaintiffs) as it does not abrogate
the well settled principle that separate and distinct claims may not
be aggregated to make the jurisdictional amount even in a class action." Id. at 993. Alvarez was the controlling authority for the
eighth circuit's per curiam decision in Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204

(8th Cir. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The conflict between the
circuits arose with Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th
Cir. 1968), rev'd, Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). In Gas Service, a consumer on his own behalf along with all other similarly situated sued to recover the gas company's overcharges. In reliance on
Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939), Gas Service held that the basic
question was whether aggregation under any circumstances can meet
the monetary restriction on federal jurisdiction. The Court looked
to the Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966), which placed
"great emphasis on the fact that the amended rule is intended to
eliminate the nice judicial distinctions and concomitant case law confusion that had arisen from a classification of class actions as 'true,'
'hybrid,' and 'spurious."' 389 F.2d at 834. In allowing aggregation
of the separate and distinct claims, the Gas Service court held:
These terms [true, hybrid, and spurious] were eliminated
in the amendment and a purely pragmatic classification was
adopted. The rule now recognizes that the procedural tool
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Snyder, in affirming the eighth circuit and reversing the fifth,
disposed of the aggregation of claims issue arising under the
jurisdictional predicate of diversity of citizenship. "Nowhere in
its decision did the seven-man majority of the Supreme Court
allude to the effect that the decisions might have upon the
future of the spurious type of class action in federal courts,
but the effect is apparent to any student of federal jurisdiction and
procedure."( 9
B. Rule 23(b)(3) and Federal Questions
Notwithstanding learned commentary to the contrary, 70 the
Supreme Court in Snyder and Zahn resolved in the negative
whether aggregation of separate and distinct claims could be
allowed in satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The impact of these two decisions extends primarily to Rule
71
23 (b) (3) class actions-the "spurious" class action.
By act of Congress in execution of Article III, section 2
of the Constitution, the jurisdictional amount requirement is mandatory in all federal question cases. 7 2

Because of the numerous

of a class action must be workable if it is to be desirable.

To now hold that the former classification of "true," "hybrid"
and "spurious" must be perpetuated to allow or defeat aggregation would seem to render the rule sterile in that regard.
389 F.2d at 834.
69. Maraist & Sharp, supra note 25, at 383.
70. 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
569, at 106 (Supp. 1967) (comment by Professor Charles Alan Wright);

Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of

JurisdictionalAmount, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 601, 609 (1969).
71. One of the major criticisms of the majority's decision in Snyder focused on the re-establishing by judicial fiat of the old nomenclature
of unamended Rule 23. 394 U.S. at 343, 354 (Fortas & Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting). Consequently, the "well settled" aggregation rules that
had developed along with the characterization of jural relations were
resurrected with regard to class actions.
In a "true" class action, the Court in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66
(1939), allowed the aggregation of joint and common interests. However, in Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916), the Court prohibited aggregation of separate and distinct claims in order to invoke jurisdiction of the federal courts. This principle was held to apply to the
separate and distinct claims of members in a "spurious" or "hybrid"

classification. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94
S. Ct. 505 (1973).
72. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, as amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1964), provides in part:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
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exceptions to the jurisdictional amount requirement enacted by
Congress, 3 the Snyder Court apparently determined that the
rule against aggregation of separate and distinct claims would
not appreciably affect the continued utilization and development
of federal question class actions.7 4 The antithesis of the Snyder

Court's conclusion, as raised by Fortas' vigorous dissent, 75 serves
as the context for the following discussion.
To appreciate fully the impact that Snyder and Zahn will
have on future class actions fashioned as federal questions, it
is necessary first to characterize the various types of federal
questions to determine whether Congress has specifically provided

arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
Generally speaking, an action involves a federal question conferring
jurisdiction in federal courts only where a right, privilege, title or
immunity created by the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States is an essential aspect of the plaintiff's cause of action; the action involves a question regarding the construction or effect of the
Constitution; or validity, construction or effect of an act of Congress
or a treaty for which determination is necessary in order to resolve
the dispute. See WRiGHT, supra note 13, at 54-59; H. HART & H.
WECnSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTE
844-926 (2d
ed. 1973); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdictionof Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639 (1942). Premised on the aforementioned
jurisdictional basis of federal question, the subsequent analysis of
whether a particular claim invokes the jurisdiction of the federal district court is twofold: first, whether the allged claim "arises under"
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; and second,
if the first is resolved affirmatively, whether the claim satisfies the
jurisdictional amount requirement. The second prong of this analysis
is the object of § 1331. Section 1331 confers general federal question
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution, on the federal district
courts. Consequently, when determining the Court's construction of
the jurisdictional amount requirement in Snyder and Zahn, it is
necessary to ascertain or characterize the type of federal question alleged in order to apply the appropriate amount in controversy provision enacted by Congress.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1335 (statutory interpleader), 1336 (Interstate Commerce Commission), 1337 (interstate
commerce and antitrust questions), 1338 (patents and copyrights),
1339 (postal questions), 1340 (internal revenue) and 1343 (civil
rights) (1970). See also WRiGHT, supra note 13, § 32, at 107-08.
74. "A large part of those matters involving federal questions can be
brought, by way of class actions or otherwise, without regard to the
amount in controversy." 394 U.S. at 341.
75. Justice Fortas argued that the effect of the majority's decision "is
substantially to undermine a generally welcomed and long-needed reform in federal procedure. . . . Its impact will be noticeable . . .
in important classes of federal question cases. .. " 394 U.S. at 332,

342 (1969).
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an exception to the amount in controversy requirement. As the
several types of federal questions are examined, the diminished
utility of the 23(b) (3) class action will become readily apparent
where satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount requirement is.
not allowed by aggregation of separate and distinct claims in
actions with common questions of law and fact.
The first category for discussion of federal questions involves
those claims, arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States, where section 1331 serves as the jurisdictional
predicate. In order to redress a claim under section 1331, the
plaintiff must consider the requirement of the jurisdictional
amount. In the landmark case of Bell v. Hood, 6 the Court
held that plaintiffs had alleged a substantial federal question
in charging defendants' violation of rights secured to plaintiffs
under the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. After determining that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded amount in controversy, the Court reversed the
lower court for denying subject matter jurisdiction over the cause
of action.
More recently, plaintiffs seeking to maintain class actions under
section 1331 have had considerable difficulty invoking federal
district court jurisdiction. In City of Inglewood v. City of Los
Angeles, 7 7 plaintiffs sought to maintain a class action based upon
the noise arising in the operation of an airport by defendant
city. In reversing the federal district court's dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint, the court of appeals held that plaintiffs had invoked
federal jurisdiction by properly alleging a substantial federal question. The court ruled, however, that the class action aspect of the
complaints should be dismissed since aggregation of separate and
was
distinct claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement
78
precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Snyder.
The Snyder decision was utilized as controlling authority frustrating plaintiff's attempt to invoke federal question jurisdiction
in Rosado v. Wyman.7 9 Plaintiff welfare recipients brought a
class action challenging the constitutionality of a New York social
services law. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals
held that although the plaintiffs may have properly raised a
federal question, they were not allowed to aggregate their separate
76. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
77. 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).
78. Id. at 952, 956-57.
79. 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397
(1970).
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and distinct8 0claims in satisfaction of the ten thousand dollar
requirement.
The first type of federal questions, cases arising under section
8l
and disheartening8 2
1331, clearly illustrates the "unfortunate
results of the continuance of the Snyder rule."83
The second category of federal questions arises through congressional enactment of substantive law creating private rights and
duties with attendent provisions for original jurisdiction in federal
courts.8 4 This type of federal question is illustrated by Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills." The Court in Lincoln
80. The district court ruled that the named plaintiffs' damages did not
exceed $10,000; however, the judge ruled that the "indirect damage"
they might sustain as a result of the reduced payments was sufficient to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 414 F.2d at
176. The court of appeals reversed by holding "'indirect damage'
is too speculative to create jurisdiction under Section 1331." Id. The
appellate court went on to observe
[i]t is firmly settled law that cases involving rights not capable of valuation in money may not be heard in federal
courts where the applicable jurisdictional statute requires
that the matter in controversy exceed a certain number of
dollars. The rule was laid down in Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 103 .. . (1847) . . . . 'The words of the act of
Congress are plain and unambiguous .... There are no
words in the law, which by any just interpretation can be
held to... authorize us to take cognizance of cases to which
no test of money can be applied. 46 U.S. at 120.'
Id. at 176-77.
81. Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of
JurisdictionalAmount, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 602, 606 (1969).
82. 49 B.U.L. REv. 682, 715 (1969).
83. Strausberg, supra note 18, at 99. For a general discussion of additional cases under the category of general federal questions, see
Strausberg, supra note 18, at 99-102. See also Opelika Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1971); Spears v. Robinson,
431 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1970); Kiernan v. Lindsay, 334 F. Supp. 588
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1971); Jones v. North Bergen, 331 F.
Supp. 1281 (D.N.J. 1971); Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dougall v. Sugarman, 330 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971);
Buckingham v. Lord, 326 F. Supp. 21& (D. Mont. 1971); English v.
Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Spears v.
Mont Etna Morris, 313 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1089 (8th
....Cir, 1969)-; -Fiseher-v Division West Chinchilla Ranch, 310 F. Supp,.
424 (D. Minn. 1970); Local 1497, National Fed'n -of Fed. Emp. v. City
and County of Denver, 301 F. Supp. 1108 (D . Colo.), appeal dismissed,
396 U.S. 273 (1969); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet
Indian Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
84. See H. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JURIsDIcTIox: A GENERAL VIEw 15-54
(1973) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY].
85. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See Strausberg, supra note 18, at 89-90, for a
general discussion of the federal question. aspects of LincolnMills.
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Mills noted it was Congress' intent in enacting the Labor Management Relations Act of 194786 that unions as well as employers
be bound to collective bargaining contracts.8 7 Although Congress
did not expressly provide a remedy compelling the employer
to bargain collectively with the union, the Court held that by
conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, Congress intended
federal courts to fashion necessary remedies. The analysis of
Lincoln Mills is twofold. First, Congress enacted substantive
policy requiring unions and employers to fulfill labor contract
obligations-the collective bargaining agreement. In so doing,
Congress created specific substantive rights and obligations of
primary conduct addressed to private parties. Second, the analysis
should focus on jurisdictional considerations of a suit seeking
redress of rights and obligations created by Congress. Section
301 of the act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any
employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this
chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of
the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against
not
the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.88
In construing section 301, the Court held that the above provisions
created substantive rights and remedies in addition to conferring
original jurisdiction irrespective of jurisdictional amount.
The Lincoln Mills decision is extremely important in that
it illustrates the type of federal question arising under the "laws"
of the United States where Congress has expressly provided
a specific exception to the amount in controversy requirement.8 9
86.
87.
88.
89.

29 U.S.C. §§ 161 et seq. (1965).
353 U.S. at 453.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (b) (1965) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1972); Harris v. Chemical Leamon Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1971); Acree v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 390 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 852 (1968); International Longshoreman's &
Warehouseman's Union v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Therefore, in regard to certain labor management questions, Congress has authorized private actions in federal courts where Snyder
and Zahn will not frustrate the utility of a Rule 23 (b) (2) or (3)
class suit.90

Beyond the area of labor law, "Congress has been far from
idle in creating new federal statutory rights during the last
decade." 91 Consequently, in each instance where Congress has
expressly enacted federal substantive rights92 or where federal
rights are to be implied from statutory enactments, 93 the juris90. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 288 F.
Supp. 504 (N.D. IMl. 1968) (employer allowed to bring class action

to enjoin labor organization from instituting strike).

91. FrIENDLY, supra note 84, at 22. Judge Friendly illustrates his point
by collecting a representative sampling of some recent congressional
enactments:
Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, § 20, 84 Stat.
1428, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (permitting actions by the SEC and
private parties for certain violations of the Act); Egg Products Inspection Act, §§ 20, 21, 84 Stat. 1631-32 (1970), 21
U.S.C. §§ 1049, 1050 (authorizing actions by the United States
for the seizure of products which are to be sold in violation
of the Act); Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 601, 84 Stat. 1134
(1970), 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (actions by private parties to recover penalties specified in the Act); Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, § 2, 84 Stat. 89, 15 U.S.C. § 1339 (authorizing actions by the Attorney General to enjoin violations
of the Act); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 8 108, 83 Stat. 756, 30 U.S.C. § 818 (authorizing actions
by the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin violations of the
Act); Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 130, 82 Stat. 157
(1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (suits by private parties to recover
statutory penalties); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, 82 Stat. 595 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1710 (suits for untrue
statement or omission to state material fact, or for prohibited
sale or lease); Wholesome Meat Act, § 16, 81 Stat. 597-99
(1967), 21 U.S.C. §§ 671-74 (actions by private parties to
challenge certain determinations of the Secretary of Agriculture and actions by the Secretary to enjoin violations of the
Act); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
§ 110, 80 Stat. 723, 15 U.S.C. § 1399 (authorizing actions by
the Attorney General to enjoin violations of the Act); 1971
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments, 85 Stat. 743 (suits
in respect of prices exceeding those permitted by Price Commission); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, § 309(b), 86 Stat. 815 (suits by Administrator to enjoin violation of the Act).
Id. at 24 n.53.
92. See note 91 supra.
93. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
In Kardon, the court held that the cause of action for redressing private claims properly invoked federal court jurisdiction. The court
found that 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1971) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provided exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs cause of action, even though the action was derived from rights implied from

the standards of primary conduct promulgated by Congress. Id. at
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dictional aspects of these enactments must be considered to determine whether section 1331's jurisdictional amount requirement has
been expressly waived.
In addition to federal statutes creating substantive rights with
corresponding provisions for federal court jurisdiction irrespective
of amount in controversy, Congress has enacted several general
exceptions to the jurisdictional amount requirement found in section 1331. 94 In more recent years, the most important of these has
probably been section 1343 (3) of Title 28 of the United States
Code9 5 which provides the jurisdictional basis for civil rights suits
in federal courts: 96
The prime vehicle for equal protection litigation ... has been
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 [Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1,
17 Stat. 13], 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 U.S.C. section 1343 (3), which are peculiarly attractive because of the97appropriate absence of any amount in controversy requirement.
Moreover, whereas traditionally civil rights actions have been confined to violations of personal liberty, 98 the Supreme Court in
Lynch v. Household FinanceCorp.9 9 extended the scope of protected
513. Thus, in the instant case, even though the rights for which plaintiffs sought recovery were implied, Congress expressly granted jurisdiction to the federal courts. Moreover, the amount in controversy
requirement was expressly waived by Congress. See also Texas &
Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
94. See note 73 supra.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:

96.

97.

98.
99.

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other
relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection
of civil rights, including the right to vote. .
Judge Friendly recently characterized private actions charging violation of federal civil rights as "the outstanding category of federal
question jurisdiction today." FRiENDLY, supra note 84, at 75. For a
concise summary of civil rights litigation, see id. at 75-92.
Id. at 19. In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the
Court held that federal district courts had jurisdiction over a civil
rights action based on § 1343, arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
without allegations or proof of any jurisdictional amount. See also
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
FRIENDLY, supra note 84, at 91 n.69.
405 U.S. 538 (1972). See Strausberg, supra note 18, at 101 n.152.
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interests to include property rights. Thus, with an expanded arena
for civil rights actions as defined by federal statutes and the Court,
"every conceivable attack on state action violating a specific provision of the Constitution"1 0" apparently comes under the umbrella
of the civil rights exception to the amount in controversy requirement.
Although Judge Friendly is correct in concluding that the
amount in controversy requirement does not hinder private actions
charging state action violation of constitutionally secured rights,
there are numerous situations where private redress of state
action in federal courts is precluded unless the jurisdictional amount
requirement is satisfied. Despite the fact a plaintiff raises a federal
question when challenging the action of state officials infringing
rights secured by federal statute, the amount in controversy nevertheless must be satisfied before the plaintiff may invoke federal
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional obstacle confronting the small
claimant clearly impinges upon the viability of a Rule 23(b) (3)
class action. 101
100. FRIE

LY, supra note 84, at 121.

101. Other than federal questions against federal officials,
[t]he remaining general federal question cases fall into two
principal classes: suits by citizens against state officers and
suits between private citizens. Under the Supreme Court's
recent ruling [in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.] the
former are now cognizable in federal court without regard
to amount, under the jurisdictional implementation of the Civil Rights Act, if the state action is alleged to have violated
the Constitution even as regards property rights. However,
the $10,000 amount is required if the complaint alleges
merely that the state has violated a federal statute, unless
the statute be one providing for equal rights of citizens, a
phrase that has properly been given a rather narrow meaning. Suits between private citizens generally will not be cognizable in the absence of the jurisdictional amount unless
there is a specific provision for such suits in the relevant
statute or they arise under one of the types of statute [sic]
described in various sections of Chapter 85, notably "any Act
of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade or commerce against restraints and monopolites." [28 U.S.C. §'1337
(1958)].

supra note 84, at 122 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See Strausberg, supra note 18, at 94-102, for a rather detailed discussion of the impact of Snyder, and now as- extended by Zahn, on federal question class actions where the amount in controversy requirement must still be satisfied. Strausberg concludes his discussion by
contending that Snyder precludes the individual with small claims
from effectively redressing federally "secured rights" in such important areas of the law as: (1) consumer protection, see E. K-rcH &
H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF TEE CoairrnvE PiRocEss 123-38
(1972); Krahmer, Some Problems of Consumer Class Actions, 7 U.
R c. L. REv. 213 (1972); (2) federal housing and tenant actions, see
FRIENDLY,
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In summary, the second general category of federal questions
includes actions based on specific congressional promulgation of
substantive rights with attendent jurisdictional provisions; or the
more general statutory waivers of the jurisdictional amount requirement as illustrated by section 1343. The jurisdictional amount
requirement in numerous instances will not impose an obstacle to
the small claimant seeking to unite with others similarly situated in
a Rule 23 (b) (3) class suit.
In the third general category of federal questions, however,
the small claimant does confront the burdensome Snyder decision.
As observed by Judge Friendly,
[tihe area where a jurisdictional amount for federal question cases
has long been recognized to be most offensive' 02 is one considered
in the discussion of suits against the United States,' 0 3 namely, suits
against federal officers or agencies to enjoin or require action alleged to be forbidden or required by federal law.' 04

In Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No.
11,105 the petitioner, in protest of the Vietnam war, returned
his draft card to his local selective service board. The board
responded by withdrawing the divinity student's exempt classification and ordering him to report for induction. The Court held
that the board had exceeded its jurisdictional authority. Despite
the statutory preclusion of pre-induction judicial review, the Court
stated that the federal district court should have granted judicial
review of the petitioner's cause of action. 10 6 The Court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case to the district court "where
petitioner must have the opportunity to prove the facts alleged
and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional require''
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 107
Although Oestereich is not a case involving a class action,
it illustrates that actions against federal officials, if federal jurisdiction is to be invoked, must be brought under the general
federal question provision of section 1331, unless Congress has

102.
103.
104.

105.

1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 696 (1971); and (3) environmental protection, see
70 COLUm. L. REv. 734 (1970); 2 EcoLoGY L.Q. 533 (1972).
See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 220 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
Wechsler].
See FRIENDLY, supranote 84, at 69-70.
Id. at 121. See Comment, The ConstitutionalImplications of the JurisdictionalAmount Provision in Injunction Suits Against FederalOfficers, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1474 (1971).
393 U.S. 233 (1968).

106. Id. at 239.

107. Id.
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expressly provided otherwise.1 08 In Hartman v. Secretary of
Department of Housing & Urban Development,'0 9 plaintiffs
brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment as to the
validity of the federal government's requirement that "occasional
consultants" undertake a loyalty oath before being compensated
for services rendered. The federal district court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice since plaintiffs failed to allege that
the amount in controversy exceeded the sum of ten thousand
dollars. The court said this sum could not be satisfied by aggregation since the class action was "spurious" in nature"10
Notwithstanding viable alternatives and recommendations to
the contrary,"' Oestereich and Hartman demonstrate how the
amount in controversy requirement, a requisite jurisdictional element in suits against the United States in federal courts, frustrates
effective redress of numerous important federal questions.
In looking back over the three general categories of federal
questions discussed above, the present "patch-work structure" of
federal questions and the requisite amount in controversy is indefensible." 2 Because of the "patch-work structure," many commentators support abolishing the jurisdictional amount requirement for
"initial invocation of jurisdiction in general federal question
cases.""13

Such a move seems necessary to assure that class actions

108. "[T]here are instances where Congress has neither provided for nor
excluded such review, and it is in these that the problem of jurisdictional amount still arises." FRmENLY, supra note 84, at 122. See 1
RECOMMENDATioN AmD REPORTS OF TE AD=IsTRAT=v CoNFERENCF OF
STATES 169 (1970) which provides that Title 28 should
THE UN=

be amended
to eliminate any requirement of a minimum jurisdictional
amount before U.S. district courts may exercise original jurisdiction over any action in which the plaintiff alleges that
he has been injured or threatened with injury by an officer
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof, acting under color of Federal law.
Professor Davis addresses the problem of amount in controversy in
actions against the United States from a different vantage. It is his
contention that § 10 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1971), serves as a congressional grant of original jurisdiction
in federal court where the requirement of jurisdictional amount has
been deleted. However, as noted by Judge Friendly, "The courts
have been slow either to affirm or to deny this proposition."
FRENDLY, supra note 84, at 122 n.65.

109. 294 F. Supp. 794 (D.Mass. 1969).
110. Id. at 796.
111. See note 108 supra.
112. FRIENDLY, supranote 84, at 123.
113. Id. See WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 110:
It is difficult to understand why there should ever be a

monetary requirement in federal question cases.

The re-
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have a viable role in resolving important federal questions involving
substantive rights and determination of public policy at the national
level of government.
C.

An Environmental Case Study

The named plaintiffs in Zahn invoked federal district court
jurisdiction by alleging diversity of citizenship. To appreciate
the full impact of the Supreme Court's affirmation of the dismissal
of the class action aspects of the case for want of the requisite
amount in controversy on the part of the unnamed class members,
the case will be considered in terms of a federal question arising
under federal common law with jurisdictional implementation
under section 1331.
In the landmark case of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,114
Illinois sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction to abate
a public nuisance of interstate water pollution. Although the
Court rejected plaintiff's contention that it had original and
exclusive jurisdiction as granted by Congress under section 1251
(a) (1) of Title 28 of the United States Code, a unanimous Court
remanded the case to the federal district court, observing that it
would be proper for the plaintiff to invoke jurisdiction based on
principles of federal common law. 115
In arriving at the determination that plaintiff's complaint
arose under federal common law, the Court noted
the question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters
creates actions arising under the "laws" of the United States within
and we also
the meaning of § 1331(a). We hold that it does;
hold that § 1331 (a) includes suits brought by a state.1 16
This conclusion was in part based on Judge Harvey M. Johnsen's
statement in Texas v. Pankey"1 7 of the controlling principle:
quirement is of extremely limited application, and when it
does apply the effect is to deny a federal forum in cases in
which the amount involved is small but for which the federal
courts have a special expertness and a special interest.
For concurrence with Judge Friendly and Professor Wright, see

AiwciEAN

LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DInsioN OF JURISDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FAmL CouRTs § 1311(a) (1969) [hereinafter cited
as ALI STUDY]; Wechsler, supra note 102, at 225-26.

114. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
115. See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 787, 789 (1963); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 412-21 (1964); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1512 (1969); Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1972).
116. 406 U.S. at 99. See also 52 NEB. L. REv. 301 (1973).
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As the field of federal common law has been given necessary
expansion into matters of federal concern and relationship (where
no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not here), the
ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them
from sources outside the State's own territory, now would and
should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard
in federal common law and so directly constituting a question
arising under the laws of the United States.1 18
Implied in the afore-mentioned statement of the court in Pankey
is the increasing awareness of the national ramifications of unabated interstate water and ambient air pollution. The Illinois decision is properly viewed as the judicial corollory to actions previously taken by Congress to meet ever-increasing problems in
this area. Because Congress had taken the initiative in response

to environmental problems,"

9

the Court viewed its tasks as defin-

ing the substantive rights and duties predicated on existing con120
gressional promulgations of national standards and policy.
117. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).

See Note, Federal Common Law and

Interstate Pollution,85 HAuv. L. REv. 1439 (1972).
118. 441 F.2d at 240, cited approvingly, 406 U.S. at 99-100.
119. See 406 U.S. at 101-03 (brief discussion of legislation pertaining to
interstate waters). In more recent years, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation concerned with air and water pollution
problems. Many enactments establish standards of primary conduct
directed to government and industry with enforcement responsibilities residing in the public as well as private sectors. See, e.g., Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857d (g), 1857h-2 (1964) (authorizing suits by the attorney general on behalf of the Environmental
Protection Agency administrator and limited actions by private individuals to enjoin violation of the act); Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1163(i) (1964) (allowing federal suits to enjoin violations of the act); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§
4910, 4911 (1970) (allowing suits by the United States to enjoin violations of the act, and limited actions by private citizens to enjoin violations of the act); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (Supp. 1973) (authorizing actions by
the Environmental Protection Agency administrator and private citizen suits to enjoin violation of the act). See generally 0. GRAy,
CASES AD MIATEmALS O ENVimON ENTAL LAw (2d ed. 1973).
120. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat.
852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970), Congress
"authorizes and directs" that "the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
Act" and that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall
...identify and develop methods and procedures... which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical consideration." Sec. 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
406 U.S. at 101-02. With this broad statement in mind, the Court in
Illinois went on to add that
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Therefore, in looking to its prior decision in Lincoln Mills, where
the Court was willing to fashion substantive rights under section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,121 the Court
when confronting an issue of environmental pollution concluded:
The remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of
remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress
provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available.
"It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal laws
where federal rights are concerned." Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457.122
Thus, with the need for uniform standards of environmental
rights as the requisite tool for implementation of congressional
policy, "only a federal common law can provide an adequate
means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.
And the logic and practicality of regarding such claims as being
entitled to be asserted within the federal-question jurisdiction
123
of § 1331 (a) would seem self-evident."'
Based on the Supreme Court's recognition of federal common
law involving interstate water pollution in Illinois, the named
plaintiffs in Zahn could have invoked the jurisdiction of the
federal district court alleging that discharge from the New York
corporation's pulp and paper-making plant violated congressional
standards giving rise to a federal question under section 1331.
Even though Illinois authorizes such suits under federal common
law as implemented by section 1331, the plaintiffs must nevertheless satisfy the requirement of jurisdictional amount. After authorizing federal question jurisdiction, the Court noted that "[t]he
considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate waters
would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount provided in § 1331 (a).1"124 Reading this language broadly, it might be
argued the Court intended all questions arising under federal common law involving interstate water pollution to satisfy the requisite
amount in controversy. Such an interpretation of the Court's decision could stem only from a misconception of the case's underlying
facts.

121.
122.
123.
124.

[t]he Federal Water Pollution Control Act in § 1(b) declares
that it is federal policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and controlling water pollution." But the Act makes
clear that it is federal, not state, law that in the end controls
the pollution of interstate or navigable waters.
406 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added).
See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
406 U.S. at 103.
Id. at 107 n.9.
Id. at 98.
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In Illinois the State of Illinois was the sole plaintiff. By
granting that Illinois' considerable interest in the purity of Lake
Michigan exceeded ten thousand dollars, the Court made it clear
that rather than assuming all interstate water pollution cases
automatically satisfy the jurisdictional amount, federal courts are
to require each individual claimant to allege the requisite amount
with respect to his own interest. This narrower reading of the
Court's language is consistent with the Zahn decision.
Although the named plaintiffs in Zahn invoked federal jurisdiction by alleging diversity of citizenship, the Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the class action since the unnamed
class members had not alleged with necessary certainty that
their interests had been damaged in excess of ten thousand
dollars. Because determining amount in controversy is the same
under both diversity of citizenship and federal questions, the
Court would deny aggregation of the unnamed class members'
claims in the hypothetical case reframed as a federal question
under federal common law just as it did in Zahn.
If the Court will not allow aggregation of unnamed class
members' claims, despite congressional promulgation of national
policies and primary conduct standards recognized in Illinois as
giving rise to federal common law, plaintiffs alleging injuries
less than the jurisdictional amount will be denied redress in
federal court. Such a result conflicts with the Court's conclusion
in Illinois that a federal common law pertaining to interstate
water and ambient air pollution is necessary to implement environmental legislation enacted by Congress.
D.

Class Actions in State Courts

Since denying aggregation of the unnamed class members'
claims bars jurisdiction of their claims in federal court under
section 1331, the following discussion will consider viability of
successful prosecution of class actions in state courts.1 25
"Although most states provide for some form of class action,
state remedies are generally inadequate, inefficient, and ineffec125. See D. JONES & C. Wnoi-, LAWYER's READY REFERENCE To CLASS
ACTIONS 55-77 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES & WErnoN]; Starrs,
The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure,
49 B.U.L. Rv. 407 (1969) (a comprehensive examination of procedural problems attendent to state class actions) [hereinafter cited as
Starrs]; Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71
COLum. L. Rnv. 609 (1971) (a definitive discussion and analysis of
the current status of class actions in most state jurisdictions) [hereinafter cited as Homburger].
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tive.' 1 26 In examining the current status of class actions at the
state level, Professor Homburger describes three types of class
action statutes which predominate in the United States: 127
(1) the New York provision, dating back to an 1849 amendment
of the Field Code, which spread to many other states; (2) state
statutes modelled on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as it existed prior to July 1, 1966; and (3) the new federal
rule 23 which has governed class actions in federal district courts
1, 1966 and which has been adopted by a number of
since July
8
states.12

As Professor Homburger's classification indicates, the statutory
class action provisions at the state level are in an evolutionary
process which has not obtained the degree of maturation found
in the federal courts.
The problems confronting the plaintiff seeking a class action
in state court is clearly evidenced in the states where the statutory
provisions of the 1848 Field Code are still maintained. As an

Starrs
example of this type of statutory class
129 action, Professor
summarized the situation in Nebraska:
The Nebraska decisions under the state's class action statute are
so few in number that wide generalization would be hazardous.
it has been held that a class action will have binding
However,
that single-issue class actions will have a preferred
effect,130
status' 3 ' and that the named representative is not free to dismiss
a class action over the objections of class memor compromise
it has been said, in dictum, that
bers.132 And, most significantly,
the economic infeasibility' 3 3 of any other course of action by the

126. Strausberg, supra note 18, at 93. See also Leete, The Right of Con-

sumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal Courts-An Analysis
of PossibleApproaches, 33 U. P=vr. L. REv. 39 (1971).

127. In addition to the three types of class action statutes identified by

128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Professor Homburger, several states do not have statutory provisions
for class actions. See, e.g., lississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and Vermont, JONEs & WELDoN, supra note 125, at 142, 146, 153, 156.
In each of these states, the common law class action is recognized
but there are no statutory procedures. See also Starrs, supra note
118, at 425-33.
Homburger, supra note 125, at 612.
Nebraska's class action statute, NEs. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue
1964), provides:
Class Actions, representation. When the question is one of
a common or general interest of many persons, or when the
parties are very numerous, and it may be impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 435-36, 113
N.W.2d 617, 622 (1962).
Id.; Gamboni v. County of Otoe, 159 Neb. 417, 57 N.W.2d 489 (1954).
173 Neb. at 438, 113 N.W.2d at 623.
Keedy v. Reid, 165 Neb. 519, 86 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
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class will cause the court to look with favor on the class action.18 4
In Nebraska as well as in other states still relying on the class
action provisions of the old Field Code, the dearth of class
action juisprudence is generally attributed to three major problem

areas.
As analyzed by Professor Homburger, the most puzzling procedural problem is presented at the very outset. 185 The difficulty
arises as a question of statutory construction.
If the8 6disjunctive "or" which connects the two clauses of the provision' were read literally, class actions would be available in two
separate and distinct situations: (1) when the question is one of
a common or general interest of many persons; or (2) when the
parties composing the class are very numerous 3 7 and it may be
impracticable to join them all. Since impracticability of joinder,
an express requirement under the second alternative clause, is not
mentioned in the first, the statute, on its face, seems to authorize
class actions under the first clause even if joinder is practicable.SS
This statutory problem is more than just of academic significance
since the disjunctive construction would aid those prosecuting
the class action in overcoming the state courts' imposition of
the burdensome requirement that all parties to the action have
a "common or general interest."'18 9 To date most courts have
failed to confront, let alone resolve, this construction problem;
consequently, the evolution of the class action at the state level
40
has been somewhat restricted.
Attendant to the statutory construction problem are the second
and third considerations of compulsory joinder of parties and
the notion of privity. Since the Field Code's class action provision was part of the same statutory provision pertaining to
joinder of parties, the courts very early saw the class action
as an escape from the common law's compulsory joinder of parties requirement. By confining judicial consideration to this restrictive view of joinder, as opposed to the more liberal rules
41
of permissive joinder of parties under the modern federal rules,'
the courts used the "common or general interest" provision as a
substantive standard defining compulsory joinder of parties. Thus,
successfully to prosecute a class action in state courts under the
134. Starrs, supranote 125, at 455.
135. Homburger, supranote 125, at 614.
136. N.Y. Session Laws 1849, ch. 438, § 119. See note 129 supra.
137. See Homburger, supra note 125, at 614, n.32.
138. Id. at 614.
139. Starrs, supra note 125, at 437.
140. Id. at 438.

141. See FED.R.Civ. P. 20. See also WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 302-06.
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Field Code, plaintiffs were required to establish that the parties
to the action had sufficient common or general interests. This
concept was traditionally construed to mean class members needed
joint or common interests in specific funds or properties. It is in
this sense that the courts required the parties to establish a privity

relationship to the subject matter of the suit.1 42 The various state

courts operating under the Field Code hardly agreed as to the
pre43
cise definitions of "common or general interest" or "privity.'
It is hardly surprising that parties attempting to use state class
actions under the Field Code, or modified versions of the Code,
have met with limited success. More important, is the inescapable conclusion that the state courts have been hostile to the
so-called "spurious" class actions. It is doubtful whether the
Zahn class members who were denied jurisdiction in federal court
could maintain a class action in a New York court, a Field
Code 44state, or in a Vermont court, a common law class action
1
state.

Based on the preceding discussion regarding the viability of perfecting a "spurious" class action in a state court, unless the ap142. See Homburger, supra note 125, at 615; Starrs, supra note 125, at 43436, 439-44.

143. See Homburger, supra note 125, at 617-21, which presents the very
restrictive view taken by the New York courts. See, e.g., Hall v.
Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1970). The New York decisions should be carefully contrasted
with the more liberal construction of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67
Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). See also Homburger, supra note 125, at 624 n.89; Annot., 132 A.L.R. 749 (1941).
144. The 1938 Federal Rule 23 class action was designed to accomplish
two basic purposes: (1) "redefine 'more incisively' the meaning of
the 'common or general interest' requirement of the Field Code."
Starrs, supra note 125, at 463; and (2) expand the restrictive Field
Code so as to provide for the "spurious" class action which in effect
abandoned the common or general interest test as to this type of class
action. Id. at 464. Few states adopting Federal Rule 23 class action
provisions left them unchanged. Many of the modifications reflected
the well-engrained class action law developed under the Field Code.
Moreover, most of the confusion plaguing the state courts where Rule
23 was adopted concerned the new "spurious" class action. The cases
confronting this new breed of class action were the source of "the
most gruesome incongruities and obscurities imaginable." Id. at 466.
Two states, Louisiana and Georgia, went so far as to do away with
the "spurious" class action altogether. Id. at 470.
Because very little law has been developed, especially in states
which adopted the third class action category, Federal Rule 23 (b) (3)
as amended in 1966, the state class action has not evolved to the
point where it can be the useful procedural tool that it is in federal
court. This would appear especially true when concern is focused

on the "spurious" type of class action. See id. at 463-92.
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proximately two hundred unnamed class members in Zahn elected
to proceed individually or, if allowed, as parties permissively joined,
they would be without redress of their alleged injuries. Moreover,
if the plaintiff lakefront owners and lessees are not allowed to
prosecute their class actions 1 45 in state court, or if they decide economic realities preclude them from individually assuming the burden of an expensive environmental suit,1 46 an important question of

environmental law will remain unlitigated. On the other hand, if
they proceed individually with their claims, the state courts are
burdened unnecessarily with multiple suits requiring repetitious
litigation of essentially identical questions of law and fact. This
creates the definite possibility that actions in various state courts
will result in legally inconsistent decisions.
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the various alternatives available to the Zahn class members, the Supreme Court's
Snyder decision, as extended by Zahn, creates an untenable
dilemma: the underlying policy of amended Rule 23 is juxtaposed
with congressional enactment of substantive rights and standards
of primary conduct which have given rise to federal common
145.

The notion that the litigants are free to pursue their rights

in a state court may not always be realistic if the state procedural system tends to discourage class actions or if the individual claims are so small that the class members are remitted to a small claims court or a court of limited jurisdiction that is not authorized to hear class actions.
7 C. WPIGHT & A. MIIILLER, FEDEAL PRACTIcE AND PRocEDuRE § 1756,
at 561 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRXGHT & MILLER]. It is important
to note that the state courts disagree about whether separate and distinct claims should be aggregated to allow parties to invoke original
jurisdiction. In Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 151 Ohio St.
417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949), aggregation of separate and distinct was
not permitted. But see Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 112, 7 S.W.2d
839 (1928). See also Annot., 141 A.L.R. 569 (1942) (general overview
of state aggregation rules); Starrs, supra note 125, at 411.
146. Whether parties might prosecute their claims individually is a multifaceted question. The individual party's decision will probably depend on the size of his claim contrasted with the cost of proving
his case. As environmental litigation has become often too costly
for the plaintiff with small claims, many claims go unredressed where
parties are not allowed the class action. Consequently, plaintiffs
should carefully consider the rules of collateral estoppel. In states

where mutuality is no longer required, small claimants individually

may be able to litigate their claims if they can offensively rely on
resolution of the same issue litigated by other plaintiffs against the
same defendant. See F. JAMEs, Civx PRocEDuRE §§ 11.18-.22 (1965);
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (rejection of the doctrine

of mutuality).
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law concerning water and air pollution. With the issue joined in
this fashion, resolution might
be realized by reconsidering the basis
1 47
for the Snyder decision.
The controlling authority for the Snyder decision was Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc.' 48 The plaintiffs in Clark joined in an action
to enjoin the state officers charged with a duty of enforcing an
automobile tax. The district court found that the plaintiffs had
sufficiently invoked federal jurisdiction by asserting that the
amount in controversy exceeded the statutory requirement.' 49 The
Court raised sua sponte the question whether jurisdictional amounts
were in controversy. Although the defendants' motion challenging
the bill of complaint for want of amount in controversy was withdrawn, the Court held:
The bill of complaint alleges generally that "the amount involved
in this litigation is in excess of Three Thousand Dollars
($3,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs." But it is plain that
this allegation is insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements
where there are numerous plaintiffs having no joint or common
interest or title in the subject matter of the suit- As the bill of
complaint shows on its face, and as the findings establish, each
[plaintiff] maintains his own separate and independent business,
which is said to be affected by the challenged fees. No joint or
common interest of [plaintiffs] in the subject matter of the suit
is shown. 5 0
After characterizing the plaintiffs' claims as separate and distinct,
the Court disallowed aggregation of claims in satisfaction of the
jurisdictional amount. Thus, the plaintiffs in Clark with claims
less than the requisite amount were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 15 '
A major criticism of the Snyder decision concerns the Court's
treatment of the Clark decision as controlling authority for the
construction of amended Rule 23. If the facts of Clark were to
confront the federal courts today, as a class action, it would be
classified as a Rule 23 (b) (2) case. The purpose underlying this
type of class action was summarized as follows:
Rule 23(b) (2) permits a class action where the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. It is intended primarily for civil rights cases,
there may well be other kinds of cases that will fall within it.152
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Strausberg, supra note 18, at 102-09.
306 U.S.583 (1939).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L.
REV. 629, 648-49 (1965).
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It is expressly limited to cases in which "final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole" will be appropriate, and thus deliberately excludes action
for damages .... 153

By placing the Clark action in the Rule 23(b) (2) category, serious
doubt can be raised whether Clark properly provides controlling
authority for Snyder on the question of amount in controversy.
In enacting the amount in controversy requirement, Congress
intended to keep insignificant cases out of federal court. 54 The
traditional test for determining amount in controversy has been
defined by Professor Dobie, 5 5 who later became a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, as the "plaintiff's viewpoint" test.156 There is no uniform agreement among the
lower federal courts as to the use of this standard for determining
amount in controversy. Moreover, during recent years, numerous federal courts have had considerable difficulty in limiting
their consideration of the amournt in controversy solely to the
value of plaintiff's interests. In Ronzio v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad,15 7 the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad
for damages and quiet title to certain water rights. The plaintiff
alleged one thousand dollars in damages; it was stipulated that
the value of the water rights was less than two thousand dollars.
The railroad removed the action to federal district court. The
plaintiff appealed the removal contending that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction because from the "plaintiff's viewpoint" the
requisite amount in controversy was less than the required three
thousand dollars. In affirming removal, the Court held it was
proper to determine the amount in controversy from the defendant's standpoint where such interests clearly exceeded the statutory requirement. 158
153. Wimr', supra note 13, at 312. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968).
154. 1 W. BmPmoN & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAczcE AwD PRocEDuRE WITa
Foams § 24, at 103 (Wright ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BAnRoN &
HoLTzoF].
155. See Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in the United States District Court,
38 HAnv. L. REv. 733, 734 (1925) (emphasis original).
[The measure of the amount in controversy is] the value to
the plaintiff of the right which he in good faith asserts in
his pleading that sets forth the operative facts which constitute his cause of action.
156. See Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 29 ST. Jon's L. PEv. 1 (1954); Note, Federal Jurisdictional
Amount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 HAnv. L.
REV. 1369 (1960); Note, JurisdictionalAmount in the Federal District
Courts, 4 V-m-D. L. REv. 146 (1950).
157. 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
158. Id. at 606. See Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 (1889), where the
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E. "Jurisdictional Amount" vs. "Case or Controversy"
In the ordinary tort or contract case where the pecuniary
interest of plaintiff's potential compensation equals the amount
of defendant's loss, the amount in controversy problem imposes
nominal difficulties. However, in cases involving injunctions, the
problem of determining amount in controversy is more acute.
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.' 5 9 illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining
the amount in controversy when pecuniary considerations are restricted to plaintiff's interest. In Clark the true amount in controversy should have been evaluated from the defendant's viewpoint.
Individually, none of the plaintiffs' claims balanced the interests of
the State of California. Moreover, the Clark case presented the
Court with a controversy that should have been viewed from the
defendant's standpoint since the pecuniary value of California's
right to continue colecting the tax would probably have been a
more accurate assessment of what was really at stake in the lawsuit. Contrary to the implications in Clark, because the Supreme
Court has not taken a definitive position on the appropriate means
to determine amount in controversy, it is not surprising that many
lower courts have continued to hold "that the amount in controversy is the value to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant,
which ever is greater."'160
The shortcoming of the Snyder Court's reliance on Clark is
best illustrated by the recent, post-Snyder decision in Berman
v. NarragansettRacing Association.'61 A class action was brought
against defendant race track for allegedly withholding distributions to purse winners. The court held that the class members
had a common and undivided interest; 162 consequently, aggregation
Court held:
It is conceded that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be determined, . . . by the increased or diminished
value of the property directly affected by the relief prayed,
or by the pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately
from the judgment.
But see St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938), where the Court seemed to follow a construction contrary to
Smith.
159. 306 U.S.583 (1939).
160. 1 BARRON &HOLTZOFF, supra note 154, at 113.
161. 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).

But

see Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970) (class
action dismissed because from plaintiff's viewpoint amount in controversy was not met; aggregation of claim denied).
162.
Further, the interest of the group of pursewinners in the
asserted right is common and undivided. "It is not necessary
that the claims of the plaintiffs be joint, in the technical legal
sense of that word, as opposed to several. But it is essential
that these claims constitute in their totality an integrated
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would have been allowed for satisfaction of the amount in controversy. 163 However, aggregation was unnecessary since the pecuniary value of the defendants' interest satisfied the jurisdictional
amount requirement. 164 The case is important because it illlustrates two propositions.
First, when one characterizes jural relationships as being separate and distinct, the thrust of the analysis centers on particular
parties possessing interests which are to be viewed individually.
Thus, when focusing on jural relationships, whether characterized
as joint, common, undivided or several, the central thrust of the
analysis concerns individual interests. Traditionally, and as revitalized by Snyder, such individual interests have been the focal
point for determining the jurisdictional amount requirement and
the attendant rules for aggregation. However, as argued by
Justice Fortas in his Snyder dissent:
Once it is decided under the new Rule that an action may be maintained as a class action, it is the claim of the whole class and
members of the
not the individual economic stakes of separate
class which is the "matter in controversy."1 65

As Justice Fortas suggested, amended Rule 23 was intended
to remove the characterization of individual jural relationships
from the context of class actions. In other words, the deterinination of the amount in controversy in a class action was to be based
on the actual "case or controversy"' 6 6 before the federal court and
not the characterization of individual jural relationships which
may, or may not, accurately reflect the true nature of the dispute
or the pecuniary interests at issue.
The second proposition suggested in Berman pertains to the
"defendant's viewpoint" as the basis for determining amount in
controversy. Focusing on the "defendant's viewpoint," thus avoidright against the defendant." A. Dobie, Federal Procedure
§ 58, at 158 (1928); Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Coker, 219 F.2d 631, 633-634 (4th Cir. 1955).
414 F.2d at 315.
163. Id. at 316.
In Snyder v. Harris, ... the Court stated that the doc164.
trine of aggregation is based upon its interpretation of the
statutory phrase "matter in controversy." ...

"But in de-

termining the matter in controversy, we may look to the object sought to be accomplished by the plaintiffs' complaint;
the test for determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce." Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d
604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940).
Id. at 314.
165. 394 U.S. at 353.
166. See generally WkrGHT, supra note 13, at 34-38.
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ing altogether the issue of aggregation, the court held, based on
the Ronzio 67 decision, that
the pecuniary result that the judgment would directly produce
would be the awarding of a fund of several million dollars to the
class. We think it is the amount of the entire fund, and not what
each pursewinner's individual share will eventually be, that determines the amount in controversy here.1 08
Although Justice Fortas' analysis of Snyder does not expressly
suggest the "defendant's viewpoint" as the proper standard for
ascertaining the amount in controversy, under the conceptual
term "case or controversy," utilization of the "defendant's viewpoint" assisted the Berman court in determining whether the
requisite jurisdictional amount had been satisfied.
The companion case in Snyder was Gas Service Co. v. Coburn 69
where the lower court, as affirmed by the court of appeals, held
that plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims could aggregate
them in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The district court arrived at this conclusion based on the 1966
amendments to Rule 23.170 In writing for the Snyder majority,
Justice Black rebutted the conclusion reached by the district court
and the court of appeals arguing that the doctrine of aggregation
was not based upon Rule 23, but rather upon "well settled" judicial
interpretation of the statutory phrase "matter in controversy.' 71
It was apparently Justice Black's position that regardless of the
1966 amendments to Rule 23, the rule that precluded parties with
"separate and distinct" claims from aggregating their claims would
remain inviolate. Because the doctrine of aggregation was predicated on judicial definitions of jural relationships in terms of joint,
common, undivided or separate and distinct, Justice Black apparently thought that unless the "spurious" class action concept was
retained in the construction of the phrase "matter in controversy,"
the jurisdiction of federal courts would be expanded sub silentio.
The fact that judgments under class actions formerly classified as
spurious may now have the same effect as claims .brought under
the joinder provisions is certainly no reason to treat them differently from joined actions for purposes of aggregation.
Any change in the Rules that did purport to effect a change
167. Parenthetically, it is important to note that the Court in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972), cited Ronzio as supporting
authority for the proposition that Illinois had amount in controversy
sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction over a claim arising
under federal common law.
168. 414 F.2d at 314-15.
169. 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
170. Id. at 834.
171. 394 U.S. at 336.
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in the definition of "matter in controversy" would clearly conflict
with the command of Rule 82 that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts ....

",172

Justice Black's argument that the Coburn Court's construction
of amended Rule 23 expands the jurisdiction of federal courts
is subject to two general criticisms. First, in resurrecting the
"spurious" class action, Snyder's reliance on the rules of aggregation regarding permissive joinder of parties is misplaced. 17 3 Not
only did amended Rule 23 do away with the "metaphysics of
conceptual analysis of the 'character of the right sought to be
enforced,"' 174 it also redefined the binding effect of class action
judgments. 17 5 It would appear inaccurate to characterize the class
actions as instances of permissive joinder of parties. Under the
concept of permissive joinder, parties may join in an action.
However, the judgment will only bind them if they so elect
such affirmative action. Judgment in an amended Rule 23(b) (3)
class action binds parties who do not "opt out" of the class
action. If a potential plaintiff sat back and passively allowed
a class action of which he was a member to go to judgment
for the defendant, he would be bound to the court's decision
under principles of res judicata. Under the same hypothetical
situation, where he was a potential plaintiff who could elect
under Rule 20 to join, he would not be bound by the defendant's
judgment. Quite clearly, amended Rule 23, by changing the res
judicata effects of judgment, can no longer be analogized to
principles of permissive joinder. Therefore, it is inaccurate to
continue analyzing Rule 23(b) (3) class actions along the same
lines as permissive joinder cases fashioned under Rule 20.176
The second criticism of the majority's decision in Snyder concerns its characterization of the class action under the amended
rule. In attempting to do away with the tripartite classification
of jural relations found in the 1938 Rule 23, the drafters of
the new rule essentially created a more defined concept of class
172. Id. at 337. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
173. 394 U.S. at 335, where the Court noted:
Spurious class actions, on the other hand, were in essence
merely a form of permissive joinder in which parties with
separate and distinct claims were allowed to litigate those
claims in a single suit simply because the different claims
involved common questions of law or fact. In such cases
aggregation was not permitted: each plaintiff had to show
that his individual claim exceeded the jurisdictional amount.
174. Id. at 343 (.Fortas & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
175. See FED.R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
176. See WnRiGH, supra note 13, at 302-06.
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action. As Justice Fortas argued in his dissent,1'7 the basic
thrust of amending procedural rules for class actions in federal
courts was to remove the emphasis on the individual claimant,
characterized in terms of jural relationships, and place the emphasis on the class as a whole. 1'7 8 In this sense, amended Rule
23 was remodeled and redesigned so that it would more accurately define the context of a "case or controversy" that arose as
a class action. Thus, once the lower court determined that a
class action can be maintained under the provisions of Rule
23(a), the class action, when viewed as a whole, comprised the
"case or controversy" in the constitutional sense.
7 9

As the Court held in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,' it
is within the province of the judiciary, as authorized by the
Constitution of the United States, 8 0 to define the "case or controversy" which comes before the federal courts."" If amended Rule
177. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
178. Id. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir.
1969).
179. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
181. 383 U.S. at 725. The Court's landmark decision in Gibbs is extremely
useful in examining the impact of the Court's later decision in Snyder,
and as extended by Zahn. Gibbs stands for the proposition that it
is proper for a federal district court, which has power over a substantial federal claim, to exercise discretion on whether state claims
raised by the same party should be pendent to the federal claim.
The constitutional authority for Gibbs stems from the notion that federal courts are empowered by the Constitution to entertain a "case
or controversy." Therefore, if the state claim arises from the same
operative facts and circumstances as the federal claim and the party
alleging the claims normally would be expected to try both claims
together, it is within the federal district court's constitutional authority to entertain both the federal and the state claims. Whether a
federal court entertains the pendent state claim is a question of discretion that is guided by standards of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to the litigants as well as principles of comity. Id. at
725-26.
If amended Rule 23 is viewed as redefining the concept of class
action in terms of "case or controversy," much of the adverse impact
of Snyder and Zahn can be neutralized. Re-examination of Snyder
and Zahn is necessary, whether by the Court or Congress, if class
action is going to be allowed a productive future involving numerous
important federal questions.
As discussed above in the text, Snyder has essentially precluded
class action redress of important questions arising under federal common law involving interstate water and ambient air pollution. Congressional enactment of substantive rights and standards of primary
conduct are demonstrative of national concern for environmental
questions. Under the Gibbs decision, just as federal courts in the
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23 more clearly defines the context of a "case or controversy" presented to the court as a class action, it hardly follows that allowing
a lower court to entertain jurisdiction over the class action has
expanded federal jurisdiction without congressional authorization.
On the contrary, jurisdiction of lower federal courts has not been
expanded. 8 2 Once it is recognized that the class action as an entity
provides the court with a justiciable "case or controversy," deternmination of the requisite amount in controversy should also be
directed to the class as a whole. 8 3 Construction of the amended
Rule 23 along these lines does not abrogate congressional intentions
84
of keeping insignificant cases out of federal courts.1
In conclusion of the Snyder discussion, it seems that the
Court's reliance on Clark as controlling authority was misplaced.
Clark was an injunctive action which under the amended rule
would fall into 23 (b) (2). Thus, assuming that the facts of Clark
would arise today in a class action, analysis of the jurisdictional
amount could be handled under the "defendant's viewpoint" theory
which would allow federal jurisdiction. By resurrecting the Clark
decision and labeling it a "spurious" class action, the Snyder Court
effectively negated the conceptual remodeling of the amended rule.
Restructuring was intended to characterize the class action in terms
of the "class as a whole" in order to make the procedural tool more
functional-more useful.

MI.

ANCILLARY JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTIONS
AND JOINDER OF PARTIES

Ancillary jurisdiction and its kissin' cousin, pendent jurisdiction,
have been the subject of much legal commentary in recent years. 85

182.
183.
184.

185.

interest of comity should avoid needless decision of state law, state
courts should be restrained from having to determine unnecessary
cases raising novel questions of federal law, whether statutory or
common law. In denying aggregation of plaintiffs' claims to satisfy
the amount in controversy, Snyder and Zahn frustrate the theory of
comity decided in Gibbs.
394 U.S. at 353-56 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 353.
In viewing the class action as a whole with individual class members
each having a common interest in the class, the amount in controversy presented to the Court in Zahn was more than $40,000,000hardly an insignificant case.
Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759 (1972); Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties", 34 U. Pi=T. L. REv. 1

(1972); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal

Courts, 20 STw. L. REV. 262 (1968); Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v.
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Therefore, rather than tracing the history and background of
those doctrines, this article shall merely attempt to describe
what they are, and how they relate to class actions and other
procedural devices that are used to bring additional claims or
parties into a lawsuit.
A.

Anclary and Pendent Jurisdiction

According to Professor Wright, ancillary jurisdiction is a concept
under which
it is held that a [federal] district court acquires jurisdiction of
a case or controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to
disposition of a matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to
decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take
cognizance were they independantly presented. Thus if the court
has jurisdiction of the principal action, it may hear also any ancillary proceeding therein, regardless of the citizenship of the parties,
the amount in controversy, or any other factor that would normally determine jurisdiction.' 86
Pendent jurisdiction is merely a subspecies of ancillary jurisdiction.' 8 7 It is frequently used to describe a situation where
a plaintiff seeks to join a state law claim with a closely related
federal claim when the federal court could not hear the state
claim standing alone. However, pendent jurisdiction is probably
more accurately described by Professor Fortune where he states:
"A pendent claim is one related to another claim in the same
pleading."'1 88 He then describes an ancillary claim as one related
Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring
Claim, 73 CoLm. L. REv. 153 (1972); Note, Civil Procedure-Ancillary Jurisdiction-The Third party Defendant's Claim under Rule
14(a), 49 N.C. L. REv. 503 (1971); Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary

Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971); Note,

UMW v. Gibbs and

Pendent Jurisdiction,81 HARV. L. REv. 657 (1968); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdictionin the Federal
Courts, 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 1018 (1962); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction
and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963).
See also H. HART & IL WECHsER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AN THE FEDERAL SysTmW 1074-81 (2d. ed. 1973).
186. WRIaGHT, supra note 13, § 9 at 19.
187. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction,33 U. PITS. L. REV. 759, 762 n.24 (1972).
188. Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-TheProblem of "Pendenting Parties",
34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 13 n.34 (1972). It would be theoretically possible

to have one federal claim pendent to another federal claim if, for
example, the first claim had no jurisdictional amount requirement
and the second claim failed to meet a jurisdictional amount requirement. In such a case, if the two claims were closely related, the
second claim could be heard along with the first under the theory of
pendent jurisdiction. Cf., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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to a claim asserted in a pleading filed at an earlier time and
usually by a different party. 8 9 Since it is generally agreed
that both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are to be tested
by the same principles, 190 the labels are probably not very important; and since pendent jurisdiction is a product of the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction,19 ' the term ancillary jurisdiction shall
be used in this article to include both concepts.
B. Scope of Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction
The guiding star for determining the present day scope of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction has been the case of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs' 92 decided in 1966. Gibbs alleged that
the union had brought improper pressure on his employer to
discharge him. He claimed violations of the Labor Management
Relations Act' 93 and the common law of Tennessee. After a
trial on the merits, the court dismissed Gibbs' federal claim,
but entered judgment for him on the state claim although there
was no diversity of citizenship. The union contended that the
court lacked jurisdiction over the state claim. Although reversing
the lower court on the merits, the Supreme Court expressly
decided that there was pendent jurisdiction to decide the state
There is no need to use the concept of pendent jurisdiction in di-

versity cases between a single plaintiff and a single defendant. So

long as diversity exists, FED. R. Civ. P. 18 "permits the plaintiff to
join as many claims as he may have against the defendant, regardless
of their nature, and the value of all the claims is added together
in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is met." WiGHT,
supranote 13, § 36 at 121.
189. A classic example of an ancillary claim is found in Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926). Plaintiffs claim alleged a
violation of the Sherman Act and was properly before the federal
court. Defendant asserted a non-federal compulsory counterclaim
that arose out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim. Since there
was no diversity of citizenship, the court could not have asserted
jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaims standing alone. The
Supreme Court nevertbless permitted resolution of the counterclaim
because of its close relationship to the claim of the plaintiff.
190. Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265,
282-89 (1971).

191. In Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the precursor of the modern

concept of pendent jurisdiction, the Court relied on the case of Moore
v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), as authority for allowing a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a non-federal claim
when there was no diversity. The holding in Hum was restricted
to situations where a plaintiff presented two distinct grounds, one
state and one federal, in support of a single cause of action.

192. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).

193. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
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claim. In so doing, the Court set out the following test:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority ...
" U.S. Const., Art. I1,
§2, and the
relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have substance
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103.

The state and

federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the
94 federal issues, there is power in federal courts
to hear the whole.'
"The commentators and the lower courts read Gibbs as broadening the scope of pendent jurisdiction, a development that some
applaud and others deplore."' 95
Although Gibbs apparently broadened the scope of the federal
courts' power to hear pendent claims, it also broadened the discretion to refuse to hear pendent claims with the following admonition:
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it
is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court
should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims ....
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter
of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring
for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. 196
It did not take long for the lower federal courts to seize
upon the language of Gibbs as authority for expanding ancillary
jurisdiction in cases where primary jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and where no "federal question" claims were
involved. In Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.,' 97 for example,
194. 383 U.S. at 725.
195. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 19 at 65, citing Note, 81 HAnv. L. REV. 657
(1968), and Note, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1631 (1966), as mildly applauding,
and Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,

20 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1968), as strongly deploring.
196. 383 U.S. at 726.
197. 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966). For similar use of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction, see Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1968), and Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), both
relying on the Gibbs analogy. See also Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.).
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a diversity action was brought for injuries sustained by a child
and consequential damage to the child's father arising out of
the same accident. The trial judge held that the father's claim
must be dismissed because it did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement that the amount in controversy must exceed ten
thousand dollars. In reversing the trial court on that point, the
court of appeals stated:
In these circumstances it seems to us both appropriate and right
to apply the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, by which a claim

cognizable in the federal courts may be permitted to carry with it a

related claim otherwise not within the federal jurisdiction, if both

claims ordinarily would be tried in one judicial proceeding. The
basis for this doctrine is the judicial economy, and the convenience
and fairness to litigants which it serves. 198

The court bolstered its argument for the use of ancillary jurisdiction in the case by citing a Pennsylvania requirement that
injuries of the nature involved in the case be "redressed in one
action."'199 However, it is difficult to understand how a rule of
state practice could confer jurisdiction on a federal court.
Until recently, ancillary jurisdiction was used primarily to
bring additional claims into a suit between parties who were
already litigating claims within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Only a few courts had used the concept to bring in
additional parties. 200 However, as the Supreme Court recently
recognized, "numerous decisions throughout the courts of appeals
since Gibbs have recognized the existence of judicial power to
hear pendent claims involving pendent parties where 'the entire
action before the court comprises but one constitutional "case"'
as defined in Gibbs."'20 ' The commentators have also noted the
increasing variety of ways in which ancillary jurisdiction has
been used to add both claims and parties to suits in federal courts
198. 364 F.2d at 564 (citations omitted).

199. Id.
200. 7 WaiGHT & Mima, supra note 144, at § 1659.
201. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713 (1973). The Court
cited Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971);
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-10 (2d Cir.
1971); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor,
Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971); F.C. Stiles
Constr. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970);

Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.
1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816-17 (8th
Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Connecticut
Gen'l Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); Jacob-

son v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson
v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1968).
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in diversity cases as well as in federal question cases. 20 2 Among
cases decided by the courts of appeals, Hymer v. Chai203 "stands
virtually alone against this post-Gibbs trend ....
Zahn in the Trial Court2°5
It was "with great reluctance"2 0 6 that the trial court dismissed
the class action aspect of the Zahn case. In his opinion, the
late Judge Leddy stated: "[I]f a construction of Rule 23 were
controlling, rather than the phrase 'amount in controversy' in
'20 7
the jurisdictional statute, our decision would be different.
However, the court was of the opinion that Snyder precluded
obtaining jurisdiction "over those members of the proposed class
who do not meet the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement. ' 20 8
Therefore, after finding that it would be impracticable to
redefine the class to include only those members whose claims
exceeded ten thousand dollars, the district court ordered "that
reference to all persons other than the four named plaintiffs
be stricken from the complaint and that [the] action not be
20- 9
permitted to proceed as a class action.
C.

The district court then certified, for interlocutory appeal under
section 1291(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code, the following
question:
"[W]hether federal courts have jurisdiction over all members of
an allegedly otherwise proper class, in a class suit in which the
claims of the class members are separate and distinct, if some
members of the class individually meet the jurisdictional requirement as to the amount in controversy
and others, who are not
2 10
named representatives, do not[?]"

202. Professor Baker applauds the trend and gives numerous hypothetical
examples of the possible uses of ancillary jurisdiction together with
appropriate citations to actual cases. See Baker, Toward a Relaxed
View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prr. L.
REv. 759 (1972). Professor Fortune agrees with the use of ancillary
in diversity cases.

See Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-Th Problem

jurisdiction in federal question cases, but cautions against the trend
of "Pendenting Partis", 34 U. PITT. L. Rnv. 1 (1972).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See also, Com-

ment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the
Jurisdiction-ConferringClaim, 73 COLUM. L. R.v. 153 (1972).
407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
411 U.S. at 713.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 434.
Id. (quotation marks original).
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D. Issues Raised on Interlocutory Appeal in Zahn

The basic issue presented by the interlocutory appeal in Zahn
was whether the trial court possessed the power (i.e., jurisdiction

over the subject matter) to hear the case as a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b) (3). As stated in the introduction to this article, that issue raised at least two questions, viz.:
First-Whether each of several class action plaintiffs who are suing a single defendant may aggregate their separate and distinct
claims in order to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)?
Second-Whether members of a class whose separate and distinct
claims do not meet the jurisdictional amount requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) may have their claims determined by a federal
court under a theory of ancillary jurisdiction where other members
of the class have
similar claims that do meet federal jurisdictional
211
requirements?
The majority opinions in both the court of appeals 212 and the
Supreme Court 213 were addressed to the first question. Neither
majority specifically answered the second question. Nevertheless, it
is obvious that the second question was answered in the negative
by both courts because both holdings upheld the ruling of the trial
court.
If the class plaintiffs had been permitted to aggregate their separate and distinct claims in order to meet the jurisdictional amount
requirement, there would have been no need to consider the second
question because the court then would have had primary (as opposed to ancillary) jurisdiction over the claims of the entire class.
However, having concluded that the claims could not be aggregated,
the court was still left in the position of having primary jurisdiction over the claims of the named parties, because their claims met
the jurisdictional amount requirement individually. That situation
left open the question of whether the claims of the non-named parties could be heard as ancillary to the claims of the named parties
over which the court could exercise primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction differs conceptually from
the principle of aggregation of claims. Perhaps this difference can
best be illustrated by examining a few non-class action situations
in which those rules apply.
211. The court of appeals also raised the question of whether the case
was appropriate for class action treatment aside from the jurisdictional questions. 469 F.2d at 1035-36. However, the trial court had
yet to give that question full consideration, having stopped at the
threshold question of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
212. 469 F.2d 1033 (1972).
213. 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973).
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If a single plaintiff has two entirely unrelated claims against
a single defendant, each for six thousand dollars, he may sue in
federal court since the total amount of the claims exceeds ten thousand dollars. 214 The federal court may exercise primary jurisdiction over both claims despite the fact that neither of the claims,
standing alone, would be cognizable in a federal court. The reason
that the federal court may exercise primary jurisdiction over the
two claims standing together is that this is one of the situations
where the federal courts permit aggregation of claims in order to
meet the amount in controversy requirement. Here there is no
room for the application of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
because there is no claim to which either claim could be ancillary.
There are only two claims, and neither of them standing alone
would sustain federal jurisdiction.
Contrast the above with the following situation: A child is
injured by the defendant and brings a claim for twelve thousand
dollars in a federal court for pain, suffering and disability. The
child's father attempts to join in the suit by bringing a claim for
six thousand dollars against the defendant for medical expenses
incurred on behalf of the child arising out of the same incident.
In that situation (assuming there was diversity of citizenship), the
the child's claim would be cognizable in a federal court standing
alone, but the father's claim would not be. It would be possible
to have a rule permitting the father to aggregate his claim with
the child's claim, but under current doctrine aggregation would
not be permitted. 215 Nevertheless, under recent holdings of several
of the courts of appeals, the father's claim could be determined
by a federal court as being ancillary to the child's
claims over
216
which the court could exercise primary jurisdiction.
In the Zahn case, the Supreme Court gave a thorough explanation of why it would not permit the claims of the class to be
aggregated in order to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. One
may not agree with the Court's resolution of that issue, but at
least one can understand how the Court arrived at its conclusion.
On the other hand, the Court gave no explanation whatsoever as
to why the claims of the non-named class members could not be
214. WRiGHT, supra note 13, at § 36.
215. Even though the father's claim is closely related to that of the child,
the two claims would still be characterized as separate and distinct,
and aggregation would not be permitted. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S.
594 (1916); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
216. See Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir.
1966), in which the facts closely parallel those given in the example.
Cf., Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969)

(Blacknun, J.); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968).
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heard under a theory of ancillary jurisdiction. By its silence on
that aspect of the Zahn case, the Court has left unanswered several
questions concerning the proper application of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is currently in a state of
flux and development. It has been applied in many different contexts in the past; since the Gibbs decision, the lower federal
courts have expanded the use of the concept. 217 As Professor
Wright noted: "If there is any single rationalizing principle that
will explain [the various uses of ancillary jurisdiction], it is not
easily discerned." 2 18 Thus, it would have been extremely beneficial in providing guidelines for the lower federal courts if the Supreme Court had explained why Zahn was not a proper case for
the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.
It is unfortunate that neither appellate majority addressed itself
to the ancillary jurisdiction issue. By their silence on that aspect
of the Zahn case, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court have
raised several questions concerning the proper application of the
concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
E. Zahn and Ancillary Jurisdiction
In his dissenting opinion in the Zahn case, Justice Brennan
pointed out that the Supreme Court has sustained the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims as well as
intervention as a matter of right. He then cited instances where
the courts of appeals have sustained ancillary jurisdiction over
cross-claims; impleaded defendants; and interpleaded defendants. 219
According to Justice Brennan:
Class actions under Rule 23(b) (3) are equally appropriate for
such treatment. There are ample assurances, in the provisions of
the rule that "the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class [must] predominate over any questions affecting only
members," to guarantee that ancillary jurisdiction will not become
a facade hiding attempts to secure federal adjudication of nondiverse parties' disputes over unrelated claims. And the practical
reasons for permitting adjudication of the claims of the entire class
are certainly as strong as those supporting ancillary jurisdiction
over compulsory counterclaims and parties that are entitled to intervene as of right. Class actions were born of necessity. The
alternatives were joinder of the entire class, or redundant litigation
of the common issues. The cost to the litigants and the drain
217. See WRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 9, and the authorities cited in note
185 supra.
218. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 9 at 21.
219. 94 S. Ct. at 514.
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on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either alternative
would have been intolerable. And this case presents precisely
those difficulties: approximately 240 claimants are involved, and
the issues will doubtless call for extensive use of expert testimony
on difficult scientific issues.
It is, of course, true that an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
in such cases would result in some increase in the federal courts'
workload, for unless the class action is permitted many of the
claimants will be unable to obtain any federal determination of
their rights. But that objection is applicable to every other exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. It should be a sufficient answer that
denial of ancillary jurisdiction will impose a much larger burden
on the state and federal judiciary as a whole, and will substanthe ability of the prospective class members to assert
tially impair220
their claims.

Justice Brennan's position is buttressed by a leading authority
on federal practice that describes the use of ancillary jurisdiction
in a case similar to Zahn as "a natural corollary to other applications of the ancillary jurisdiction concept.1221 Judge Timbers, dissenting from the majority opinion of the court of appeals in Zahn,
chided the majority for ignoring
the well-established principle that if a case is properly in a federal
court, that court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case or
controversy in its entirety and therefore can adjudicate related
claims of2 22ancillary parties who have no independent jurisdictional
grounds.

Characterizing the court of appeals' reliance on Snyder as being
unsupportable, Judge Timbers went on to point out: "In Snyder
no member of the class had a claim that could satisfy the amount
so the Court never reached the ancilin controversy requirement;
'223
lary jurisdiction issue.
Furthermore, the class action in Zahn seemed to meet the requirement set out in Gibbs.224 The claims of the named plain220. Id. at 514-15.
221. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 144, § 1756 at 564.

222. 469 F.2d at 1036.
223. Id. at 1038.
224. The Gibbs test is set out in the text accompanying note 194 supra.
Of course, the Gibbs test is phrased in terms of a state claim being
ancillary to a substantial federal claim, the federal claim being necessary for the court's primary jurisdiction. However, the test for the
substantial federal claim required by Gibbs is taken from Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105-06 (1933), and is the
same test used to measure the substantiality of the claim in any federal question case. Therefore, it seems logical to state that tae requirement of Gibbs is that there be some claim, either fderal question
or diversity, that confers subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
court.
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tiffs were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court. The claims of the named plaintiffs and the claims of the
other members of the class derived from a common nucleus of operative fact. Finally, the claims of the entire class were such that
one would ordinarily expect them to be tried in one judicial proceeding, if possible. To say that the claims could not be tried
in one judicial proceeding because the court lacked jurisdiction
would be begging the question
As the Court noted in Gibbs, the justification for the use of
ancillary jurisdiction "lies in considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants .... ,,225 Surely those goals
would have been fostered by allowing the Zahn case to proceed as
a class action.
F.

The Ben-Hur Doctrine-Does It Still Live?

Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse
citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members
are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even
though all other members of the class are citizens of the same
State as the defendant and have nothing to fear from trying the
lawsuit in the courts of their own State.
The italicized statement above is from Justice Black's opinion
in Snyder.226 It describes a doctrine derived from the case of
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,2 27 and is recognized as being
currently applicable by the leading authorities on federal practice. 228 It raises one of the most vexing questions left unanswered
by the Court's opinion in Zahn. This can be illustrated by examining two hypothetical cases.
Case 1-A Rule 23 (b) (3) class action diversity suit in which each
member of the class has a claim in excess of ten thousand dollars.
The named plaintiffs are citizens of State X. The defendant is a
citizen of State Y. All of the un-named plaintiffs are citizens of
State Y.
Case 2-A Rule 23 (b) (3) class action diversity suit in which
each named plaintiff has a claim in excess of ten thousand dollars.
The un-named members of the class have claims of less than ten
thousand dollars. All plaintiffs are citizens of State X. The defendant is a citizen of State Y.
Assuming that the Ben-Hur Doctrine is still valid, the claims
225.
226.
227.
228.

383 U.S. at 726 (1966).
394 U.S. at 340.
255 U.S. 356 (1921).
See 7 WRIGHT & MLimLR, supra note 144, § 1755 at 548; 3B MooRE,
supra note 32, 23.95 at n.4.

192

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 2 (1974)

of all of the class members in Case 1 could be determined by a
federal court. In Case 2, only the claims of the named class members could be determined by a federal court; and since all of the
named class members would already be joined in the suit, the case
could not proceed as a class action in a federal court. That just does
not make any sense. Indeed, it must be questioned whether the
Zahn case overruled the Ben-Hur Doctrine sub silentio!
In both hypothetical cases, the claims of the un-named class
members would not be cognizable as individual claims in a federal
court because in both cases the claims of the un-named members
fail to meet the requirements of the statute that confers diversity
jurisdiction on the federal courts.2 29 However, under the Ben-Hur
Doctrine, the claims of the un-named members in Case 1 could
be determined in a federal class action under the theory of ancillary jurisdiction. The holding of the Zahn case means that the
un-named of the class in Case 2 cannot have their claims determined
in a federal class action under a theory of ancillary jurisdiction.
The majority opinion in Zahn explains that since the First
Judiciary Act of 1789 the statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction
on the federal courts have had an amount in controversy requirement and since 1832 "multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct
claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement for
suit in the federal courts. '2 0 The majority opinion neglects to
point out that those same statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction
have been interpreted to require complete diversity of citizenship
between all plaintiffs and all defendants since 1806. 231
Furthermore, when the Ben-Hur case was decided it had not
yet been authoritatively determined whether the requirement of
complete diversity was a constitutional requirement, or merely a
requirement of the diversity statute.2 32
Because the jurisdictional amount requirement is statutory in
character and the diversity of citizenship and federal question requirements are constitutionally based, the use of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction to overcome the latter type
of subject matter ju233
risdiction defect is more difficult to justify.
If the plaintiffs in hypothetical Case 1 may have their claims
heard in a federal class action, a fortiori, the plaintiffs in hypothet229.
230.
231.
232.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
94 S. Ct. at 508.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), the
Court held that complete diversity was not a requirement of the Constitution.
233. 7 WniGm &Mnam?, supra note 144, § 1659 at 315.
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ical Case 2 should be allowed to do likewise, since the requirement
of diversity has greater dignity than the amount in controversy
requirement, which is not based on the Constitution.
Yet, in the Zahn case itself, the Ben-Hur Doctrine was used
by the trial court to circumvent the requirement of complete diversity. The defendant contended that some of the class members
were citizens of the same state as the defendant and that the court
therefore did not have jurisdiction over the claims of those class
members. The district court found that argument to be "clearly
23 4
untenable," citing Ben-Hur.

So closely parallel were the issues in Ben-Hur and Zahn that
it is very difficult to distinguish them.23 5 Perhaps, that is why
the Supreme Court chose not to do so.
If the Zahn case does in fact overrule Ben-Hur, it will have
a significant effect upon suits involving unincorporated associations.
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an unincorporated association is said to have no citizenship of its own. Thus, if suit is
brought by or against an association as an entity or by or against
its individual members, the organization's citizenship is deemed
to be the same as that of its members. This effectively may bar

resort to federal diversity jurisdiction because the requirement of
complete diversity is virtually impossible to satisfy in cases in-

volving large multistate associations. In sharp contrast to this,

the approach [that has been] utilized when the association sues
or is sued in a class action is that the citizenship of the class is

considered to be that of the named representatives; the representatives usually can be chosen to insure complete diversity.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the treatment of unincorporated associations as classes [has provided] substantial benefits
from the perspective of ...

subject matter jurisdiction ....

Fur-

thermore, when the association is a defendant, plaintiffs ability to
select the class representatives enables plaintiff to choose his
adversaries, which is helpful for purposes of securing personal
234. 53 F.R.D. at 430-31.
235. Ben-Hur could be distinguished from Zahn in that it was a "true"
class action in which the members of the class had a common and
indivisible interest in the subject of the action. See 255 U.S. at 361.
In that sense, it would be easier to classify the claims of the class
members in Ben-Hur as one constitutional "case" in determining
whether it qualified for ancillary jurisdiction treatment. However,
the Ben-Hur Doctrine (as opposed to the case itself) has not been
restricted to "true" class actions. Furthermore, there was no suggestion in the Zahn opinion that the claims of the class members did
not constitute one constitutional "case." Indeed, if a judgment in a
Rule 23(b) (3) class action is binding on all of the members of the
class, it would be difficult not to characterize it as a single constitutional "case."
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jurisdiction, especially when a national organization is involved. 23 6
If Zahn has abrogated the Ben-Hur Doctrine, the foregoing benefits
of that doctrine are wiped out.
By failing to explain why use of ancillary jurisdiction was not
appropriate, the Zahn case raises questions about the current
and future use of ancillary jurisdiction in cases other than class
actions. The non-aggregation rule expressed in Zahn and Snyder
was spawned by cases involving joinder of parties.23 7 In recent
years, the theory of ancillary jurisdiction has been used to permit
joinder of parties in cases where some of the parties have had
claims that were separate and distinct and did not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. 238 Are those cases now overruled
by Zahn? Does the Zahn holding, forbidding the use of ancillary
jurisdiction to overcome the jurisdictional amount requirement,
carry over to cases involving joinder of parties? Only time will
answer those questions. The opinion of the Court in Zahn did not.
That is the trouble with Zahn.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Zahn decision dealt a crippling blow to use of the class
action as a means for redress of small claims in the federal courts.
Use of the class action in state courts does not present a viable
alternative because many states lack a class action rule comparable
to Federal Rule 23. It seems highly unlikely that Zahn will be
overruled in the near future. Hence, it seems that the solution
to the problem of availability of the class action for redress of small
claims will have to lie in the enactment of remedial legislation,
state and federal.
236. 7A WniGmr & MILLR, supra note 144, § 1861 at 454-56.
237. See, e.g., Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); Troy Bank v. G.A.
Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
238. See, e.g., Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.
1969) (Blackmun, J.); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968);
Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson
v. American Chain &Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).

